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OUT OF FOCUS: THE FUZZY LINE
BETWEEN REGULATORY "TAKINGS"
AND VALID ZONING-RELATED
"EXACTIONS" IN NORTH
CAROLINA AND FEDERAL
JURISPRUDENCE
ALBERT
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!i
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I

BENSHOFF*

INTRODUCTION

The line between a "taking" and an "exaction" is unclear to
property owners and legal practitioners. For most of the century,
the courts have wrestled with this problem, yet the state of the
law is still confused at best. Justice Brennan expressed the problem well in his dissent in First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. Los Angeles County:1
It is no answer [to the problem of defining a regulatory taking] to
say that "[a]fter all, if a policeman must know the Constitution,
then why not a planner?" To begin with, the court has repeatedly
recognized that it itself cannot establish any objective rules to
assess when a regulation becomes a taking. How then can it
demand that land planners do any better? However confusing
some of our criminalyrocedure cases may be, I do not believe they
have been as open-ended and standardless as our regulatory takings cases are. As one commentator concluded: "The chaotic state
of taking law makes it especially likely that availability of the
damages remedy will induce land-use planning officials to stay
well back of the invisible line that they dare not cross.,,2

* B.S. (1976) and M.R.P. (1982), both from the School of Natural Resources,
The University of Michigan; J.D., N.C. Central University (Evening program
1993). Member, American Institute of Certified Planners (1988). The author has
worked as a city and regional planner in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, South
Carolina and North Carolina over the past 15 years. The author dedicates this
article to Laura, Matthew and Christine Benshoff, without whose loving support
it could not have been written. Professors G. Nicholas Herman and Thomas W.
Earnhardt, School of Law, N.C. Central University provided the counsel,
inspiration and faith in the author which made this article possible.
1. 482 U.S. 304, 341, n. 17 (1987).
2. [d. (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.
26 (1981) (Brennan, J ., dissenting) and Corwin W. Johnson, Compensation for
333
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Justice Brennan went on to describe the unique constitutional
dilemma facing land use planners:
[N]ot every missed call by a policeman gives rise to civil liability;
police officers enjoy individual immunity for actions taken in good
faith. Moreover, municipalities are not subject to civil liability for
police officers routine judgment errors. In the land regulation context, . . . I am afraid that any decision by a competent regulatory
body may . . . give rise to liability.... 3

This comment defines the current state of North Carolina and
federal law while seeking to provide some practical guidance to
the regulatory groups mentioned above.
II.

DEFINITIONS

What is a Taking?
The law of a "taking"4 is based on the Fifth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution,5 which provides in part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."6 The
Fourteenth Amendment7 makes the Takings Clause applicable to

A.

Invalid Land - Use Regulations , 15 GA. L. REV. 559, 594 (1981)) (and citing Allen
v. City and County of Honolulu, 571 P.2d 328, 331 (Ha. 1977); Charles v.
Diamond, 360 N.E.2d 1295, 1305 (N.Y. 1977); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,713714 (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v.
City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978); Jonathan B. Sallet, The Problem
of Municipal Liability for Zoning and Land - Use Regulations , 31 CATH. U. L.
REV. 465, 478 (1982».
3. Id. (citations omitted).
4. See, e.g., DONALD G. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAW § 179, at 320 (1975); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § A, at
20 (1988).
5. u. S. CONST. amend. V.
6. Id. The text of the Fifth Amendment reads:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in
cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use without just compensation.
Id. The North Carolina Constitution has a similar provision. See infra note 85.
7. U. S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 states:
All persons born and naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
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the states. 8 When local governments enact land use regulations
under their police power authority,9 a taking may be found when
such regulation deprives a property owner of all reasonable uses
of the property. 10
B.

Exaction Defined
An "exaction" is a requirement that a property owner either
give up a property right or pay a fee, or both, in order to be able to
use the property in a certain way.ll An exaction may have a substantial effect on the value of property.12 If such exaction is not
grounded in an important public purpose,13 or if there is no
rational basis or "nexus" between the stated government objective
and the exaction,14 a taking of property without compensation
may be found. As one North Carolina land use law scholar defines
exactions:
[A] condition of development permission that requires a public
facility or improvement to be provided at the developer's expense.
Most exactions fall into one of four categories: (1) requirements
that land be dedicated for street rights-of-way, parks, or utility
easements, and the like; (2) requirements that improvements be
constructed or installed on land so dedicated; (3) requirements
that fees be paid in lieu of compliance with dedication or improvement provisions; and (4) requirements that developers pay
"impact" or "facility" fees reflecting their respective prorated
shares of the cost of providing new roads, utility systems, parks,
and similar facilities serving the entire area. 15
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

Id.
8. Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 266 (1887).
9. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 481
(1987).
10. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992);
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255
N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1962); Roberson's Beverages v. City of New Bern, 6
N.C. App. 632, 171 S.E.2d 4 (1969).
11. RICHARD D. DRUCKER, INST. OF GOVERNMENT, DEVELOPER EXACTIONS: AN
INTRODUCTION (1994).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (U.S.
1992); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
15. Richard D. Drucker, "Taking" Found for Beach Access Dedication
Requirement, 30 LOCAL GOv'T LAw BULLETIN 2 (In st. of Gov't) (1987).
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The two legal concepts are not distinct, but rather, they exist
on a continuum. It is of keen interest, for example, for property
owners to know the extent of the property rights they must give
up in order to develop their property. On the opposite side, the
government needs to know how far it can go in abating nuisances
or requiring dedications of or payments for improvements to
properties and infrastructures. Without some form of exaction, the
government's only recourse is to acquire an interest in the property or pay for the improvements.

III.

CONCEPTUAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
OF THE TAKING CLAUSE

A.

Takings Based on Application us. Language of a Zoning
Ordinance

Facial takings of property16 occur where the text of a zoning
ordinance is so restrictive that the property owner can realize no
economic return from her property.17 The property owner may
bring a facial challenge opposing the restrictions based on the taking clause. 18
Zoning or other land use regulations may not be a facial taking, yet they still could result in a taking when applied to a particular piece of property.19 The typical example is a zoning
ordinance which diviq.es a community into districts. The same
zoning district mayor may not invoke a taking, depending onthe
characteristics and use of the property to which it is applied. 20
For example, a zoning district allowing no lots smaller than one
acre when applied to existing lots of smaller size may prevent land
owners from developing their property in any economical way.
Such "down zoning" has also been found by some courts to exclude
entirely certain socio-economic groups from a community by some
state courts. 21 Zoning to protect natural resources or to protect
people from natural disasters has been found to be an unconstitu16. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.0.1, at 21 (1988).
17. Id. See, e.g., Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2887; S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10, et seq.
(Law. Co-op 1990); CARY, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Ch. 8, p. 1 Appendix A
(1992); RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10-2030 (1992).
18. See MANDELKER, supra note 4,2.0.1., at 21.
19. [d.
20. [d.
21. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 336·A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975). North Carolina courts have not adopted the
position of the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Mt. Laurel cases.
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tional taking where the property owner has been deprived of all
"reasonable" economic return from her proper ty.22 These distinctions are discussed more extensively in sections IV through VII.
B.

Categories of Regulatory Takings

The earliest category of taking was the "physical occupation"
of real property by government. 23 This doctrine was recognized
through the latter part of the nineteenth century.24 Gradually,
the physical occupation doctrine was expanded to include takings
base solely on land use regulations. 25 By the late twentieth century, the doctrine of regulatory takings has blossomed to include
at least three kinds of regulatory takings. 26
One category of takings cases involves a land use regulation
adopted to assist in a government enterprise. 27 Examples include
zoning districts which assist in the operation of airports,28 and
land fills.29 To provide a clear zone for aircraft operation,30 or to
lessen the negative effects of the operation of a land fill on a residential neighborhood,31 a zoning district which restricts height
22. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304
(1987).
23. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.0.2 at 21. See, e.g., Loretto v. TelePrompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
24. See Mandelker, supra note 4, at 14.
25. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. lIempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (upholding
ordinance effectively closing plaintiffs quarry); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.s. 272
(1928) (upholding the granting of no compensation for the destruction of a grove
of cedar trees on the order of the State of Virginia to prevent blight reaching
apple trees); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(upholding a comprehensive zoning ordinance for the first time); Hadachek v
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (upholding a regulation effectively closing a brick
mill); Mugler v. State of Kansas, 123 U.s. 623 (1887) (upholding a state law
closing a brewery).
26. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.0.3 at 21.
27. A government enterprise is one in which government operates a service or
business in lieu of or in cooperation with the private sector. Municipal electric
utilities are one example.
28. See CARY, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Ch. 10, p. 1 (1992); RALEIGH, N .C.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES, § 10-2050 (1992) (applied to the respective jurisdictions
principal airport).
'
29. There exist various industrial zoning districts applied to rural or
agricultural lands, see WAKE COUNTY, N.C., ANNOTATED ZONING ORDINANCE, § 11-12 (1991).
30. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.0.3 at 21.
31. Id.
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and land uses in the former case and land uses in the latter can be
enacted. A land owner may argue that the land use regulation is a
taking because he is deprived of the use of the land without
compensation. 32
A related category of land use regulations involves a "publie
benefit" paid for by a private land owner.33 The classic example is
the designation of an historic landmark which limits the Owners
use of the property, yet which is deemed to benefit the entire
community.34
The third and most common type of land use regulation
defines zones for diverse land uses in order to mitigate conflicts
between incompatible land uses. · Comprehensive zoningordinances enacted by municipalities and counties are the typical
North Carolina example. 35 Under this category, land owners complain when their land is either not zoned for a use which is as
intensive as the landowner would like, or is re-zoned by the zoriing
authority to a less intense use (i.e. "down zoning").36

C.

Theories Under the Fifth Amendment Taking Clause

The taking (or takings) clause ·is the final clause of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It states "rior shall private
32. In the alternative, a municipality could exercise its eminent domain
authority under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40A et seq. A land owner can also seek relief
under the doctrine of inverse condemnation. PATRICK HETRICK & JAMES
McLAUGHLIN, WEBSTER'S REM:'· ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA §§ 401-08 '(19~8
& supp. 1991).
33. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2:0.4 at 22.
34. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)
(upholding a city's refusal to allow Penn Central to build an office tower on top of
historic Penn Station, finding no taking). Contra United Artists Theater Circuit,
Inc. v. Philadelphia Historical Comm'n, 595 A.2d 6 (Pa. 1990) (finding a taking
where a city required theater owners to maintain the exterior and interior of the
theater at owner's expense). The cases can be distinguished on the grounds that
the New York ordinance did not require that the interior of the building be
preserved and that the owners could transfer the office tower density to a nearby
site, thus avoiding a taking.
35. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-360 et seq. The North Carolina courts have
defined the sufficiency of zoning ordinances in a circular manner; if all of the
community is zoned according to the same zoning ordinance, the "comprehensive
plan"is met. In other words, a "comprehensive plan" is a plan which zones an
entire city according to the same zoning ordinance, instead of just a portionofthe .
city. Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C. 530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1971).
36. "Down zoning" is an ambiguous land use planning term of art generally
meaning zoning to a less intense use. See MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.0.5, at
22.
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property be taken for public use without just compensation." The
meaning and interpretation of this clause has been the source of
an extensive body of legal literature. A few of the principal theories of the taking clause are mentioned briefly below. It is not the
purpose of this paper to expound on the following theories, rather
it may be helpful to see how they have been used, or discarded, by
the courts in the sections that follow.
The leading proponent of the enterprise-arbitration theory is
Profess.or Joseph Sax. 37 Sax proposes that all takings be analyzed
on the basis of the reasons for the government regulation leading
to the taking. Under this theory all takings resulting from government enhancement of government controlled enterprises are
viewed as constitutional takings requiring compensation. A regulation severely restricting uses around an airport is an example. 38
All economic losses resulting from government regulations based
on the police power, no matterhow severe, are not compensable. 39
This theory has not been followed by either the federal or the
North Carolina courts.
A classic theory is the harm-benefit theory.4o In short, this
theory would uphold all land use regulations that prevent harm,
but find unconstitutional all those which confer a public benefit.41
For example, a zoning ordinance preventing a steel mill from
locating in an established residential neighborhood would be
upheld as preventing a public harm, while an ordinance requiring
preservation of an historic structure would be deemed an unconstitutional taking as conferring a benefit on the public at large.
While some U.S. Supreme Court decisions have discredited this
theory,42 it still makes up an part of the balancing test followed
by most jurisdictions. 43
37. Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L. J. 36 (1964).
38. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.0.7 at 23.
39. Sax, supra note 37, at 37.
40. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.0.8, at 24.
41. See ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 546-47 (1904); Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic
Basis for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958).
42. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). But see Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
43. The North Carolina courts also follow this test. For a discussion of the
North Carolina court's ends-means test, see infra notes 81-93 and accompanying
text.
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Both the United States44 and North Carolina Supreme
Courts 45 have held that a very important factor in taking cases is
whether or not the land owner has been denied all economic Use
of her land. This doctrine is known as the economic loss theory.46
The basic premise of this theory is that a taking is worked through
the application of a zoning ordinance where a property owner is
denied all "reasonable" use of her land. The theory then shifts the
focus of analysis from a question of a taking to what is a reasonable use of a specific property at given time. This leads the courts
to a subjective judgement as to whether the zoning ordinanee
allows any reasonable use. The courts have not consistently used
or applied the economic loss theory. The most common approacla
has been the one followed by the United States Supreme Court: If
a property owner must give up some real property, no matter how
little, or how briefly, the government has worked a taking and
owes the property owner some compensation. 47 The North Carolina courts follow the federal courts in this area. This analysis
ultimately does not answer the takings muddle, it merely redefines some terms and shifts the scope of the analysis.
In 1922 Justice Holmes held that a taking does not occur via a
land use regulation when that regulation confers an "average reciprocity of advantage" on the regulated. 48 Where a property is both
"burdened" and "benefited" no taking occurs if the benefit and burden cancel each other out.49 Any given zoning designation both
benefits and burdens Ii given parcel of real estate. For example, a
typical urban North Carolina "single family residential" zoning
district allows a maximum density of approximately four dwelling
units per acre. Property owners are burdened because they cannot use their property in any other way than residential, except
within very narrow limits. 50 Benefits are obtained as all of the
44. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
45. See, e.g., Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1962);
Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601, 376 S.E.2d 22 (1989) rev'd on
other grounds, 326 N.C. 1, 387 S.E.2d 655 (1990).
46. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.0.9, at 26.
47. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482
U.S. 304 (1987) (temporary taking); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (taking of a few cubic inches in which to place
cable equipment on an apartment building).
48. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
49. [d. See also MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.10, at 27.
50. CAiw, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, 5 R-12 Appendix A (1992); RALEIGH,
N.C ., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 10-2017 (1992). In both districts only a few
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property owners are burdened in the same way. Thus a neighbor
cannot legally erect a nuisance or create a noxious use on her
property.
The fifth and most important test is the balance test. 51 Most
jurisdictions, including North Carolina,52 balance the harm suffered by the individual property owner against public purposes
advanced by the land use regulation to determine if a land use
regulation is a taking. 53
All five theories have their limitations. N one is a perfect
model of reality. The federal and North Carolina courts have chosen to use and discard pieces of all the theories. In any given opinion, pieces of these theories will be juxtaposed in an arbitrary
fashion. These theories should be thought of as a menu of options
for legal analysis and not as a rigorous analytical framework.
Their more important use in this article is to provide a basic analytical framework with which to examine the following cases. The
balance of the article covers the evolution of the law of takings in
North Carolina, with references to seminal United States
Supreme Court decisions which ' shaped our law. The following
cases are not categorized by the five theories discussed supra, but
the reader may discern judicial allusions to the theories in all of
the following cases.
IV.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW BEFORE

1987

Several landmark cases settled North Carolina law in this
area prior to the modern North Carolina and United States
Supreme Court rulings. These cases are discussed briefly in this
section. From the advent of zoning54 to the present the North
Carolina courts have consistently interpreted questions of regulatory takings along the lines of the following cases and as discussed
further in Section V.55
ancillary uses are permitted in addition to single family homes, such as
swimming pools, tennis courts and day care homes. More intensive uses, such as
tennis and swim clubs and day care centers, are not permitted.
51. MANDELKER, supra note 4, § 2.11, at 28.
52. Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601, 376 S.E.2d 22 (1989),
rev'd on other grounds, 326 N.C. 1, 387 S.E.2d 655 (1990); Roberson's Beverages
v. City of New Bern, 6 N.C. App. 632, 171 S.E.2d 4 (1969).
53. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
54. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)
55. See infra text and accompanying notes 107-278.
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In 1962 the North Carolina Supreme Court held, in Helms v.
city of Charlotte, 56 that the city of Charlotte could not use zoning
to totally eliminate the value of a property.57 Like many land use
cases, the facts of Helms are confusing.
In February, 1957 Charlotte legally adopted a zoning ordinance revision changing the zoning of the plaintiffs property from
industrial to "Residential-1."58 The then-owner of the property
obtained a permit from the city to bury oil tanks on the property.
The owner sold the property to the plaintiff in July, 1957. The
plaintiff then obtained a new or updated permit from the city and
proceeded to bury oil tanks and bring in six vertical feet of fill at a
cost of $5,500. Then the plaintiff applied for a building permit so
that he could erect a small office building on the property. The
city refused to issue a building permit for a use not in compliance
with the zoning ordinance. The city also refused to rezone the lot
from residential back to industrial. 59
The plaintiff sued, contending that the ordinance destroyed
all practical use of his property,60 as it could not be profitably
developed for a residence. 61 At trial it was established that the
residential zoning reduced the value of the plaintiff's property by
two thirds. In order to comply with the building code the only
house that could physically fit onto the lot would have to be constructed with a different sized foundation and roof for every room.
The trial court found that no regulatory taking had occurred, as a
residence could be built. 62..56. 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
57. Id. at 653, 122 S.E.2d at 821.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 653, 122 S.E.2d at 821. In July, 1957, five months after the
property had been rezoned to residential uses, the plaintiff received a permit
from Charlotte to install oil tanks and other improvements at a cost of $5,500.
The permit was issued due to the error of a city official. Id. The supreme court
held that "a municipality cannot be estopped to enforce a zoning ordinance
against a violator by the conduct of its officials in encouraging or permitting the
violation." Id. at 652, 122 S.E.2d at 821 (quoting Raleigh v. Fisher, 232 N.C. 629,
635, 61 S.E.2d 897, 902, (1950».
Changes to the law of vested rights may mean that this is no longer good
law. A substantial investment by a property owner prevents a local government
from changing the zoning to render the investment a non-conforming use. This
issue has not yet been litigated under the revised statutes. See N.C. GEN STAT.
§ 160A - 385.1 (Supp. 1993).
61. Helms, "255 N.C. at 653, 122 S.E.2d at 821.
62. Id.
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The supreme court adopted the rule on when a taking occurs
almost verbatim from a treatise:
[Z]oning cannot render private property valueless ... if the application of a zoning ordinance has the effect of completely depriving
an owner of the beneficial use .of his or her property by .preduding
all practical uses[,] or the only use to which it is reasonably
adapted, the ordinance is invalid .... A zoning ofland for residential purposes is unreasonable and confiscatory and therefore illegal where it is practically impossible to use the land in question
for residential purpOSeS. 63

According to the court, the issue was the value, either real or practical, of the lots as zoned. 64 In light of its holding the court ruled
that the trial court did not make its factual findings within the
proper legal framework. 65 The trial court should have determined
whether the property zoned for residential uses, "would be practical, desirable and of reasonable value. In short the court did not
find that the lot had any reasonable value for residential use and
such use was practical."66 The court remanded the case for a
determination of whether the property was usable at all for residential purposes after it was rezoned from industrial to residential. 67 If the property had no "value or reasonable use"68 a taking
had occurred.
In 1969 the court of appeals revisited the issue in considering
Roberson's Beverage v. City of New Bern,69 a case with similar
facts. In 1947 the plaintiff built a soft-drink bottling plant and
warehouse on the property.70 The plaintiff then used the property
legally under the zoning ordinance for the next twenty years.71 In
1968 the City of New Bern changed the zoning of the plaintiffs
bottling plant from business or commercial use to residential (in
part) and office or institutional. 72
63. Id. at 653, 122 S.E.2d at 822 (quoting 8 CLARK . A. NICHOLS ET. AL.,
MCQUILLIN: MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 25.45, at 152-53 (3d ed. 1987».
64. Id. at 656, 122 S.E.2d at 824.
65.Id.
66.Id.
67. Id. at 657, 122 S.E.2d at 825.
68. Id.
69. 6 N.C. App. 632, 171 S.E.2d 4 (1969).
70. Id. at 633, 171 S.E.2d at 5.
71. Id. at 634, 171 S.E.2d at 5.
72. Id. (the city of New Bern rezoned the plaintitl's property from one zone to
two, in effect "split zoning" the property).
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The trial court declared New Bern's zoning ordinance to be
invalid, unenforceable and void as it related to the property in
question and enjoined the city from enforcing the ordinance with
respect to the plaintiffs property.73 The trial court's holding was
based on a finding that the plaintiffs property had no practieal
use or reasonable value and was unsuitable for the uses allowed
under the new zones. 74 The trial court concluded that "the ordinance as it relates to the subject property tends to destroy all its
practical use and value and . . . render[s] it practically valueless
and . . . deprive[s] the owner of its beneficial use ... the ordinance
is unreasonable and confiscatory and therefore illegal."75
The court of appeals held that the plaintiff had to establish
that the property was rendered valueless. 76 The court also reiterated the long held judicial presumption as to the validity of zoning
ordinances. 77 The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding
that a showing of diminution in value of property caused by the
application of a zoning ordinance does not constitute a taking. 78
The court also reiterated the general philosophy of the North Carolina Supreme Court in regard to regulatory takings, quoting the
words of former Chief Justice Barnhill:
Each person holds his property with the right to use the same in
such manner as will not interfere with the rights of others, or the
public interest or requirement. It is held in subordination to the
rights of society. He may not do with it as he pleases any more
than he may act in accordance with his personal desires. The
73. Id. at 636, 171 S.E.2d at 6.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 637, 171 S.E.2d at 6.
77 . Id. at 637,171 S.E.2d at 7. The court of appeals relied on long-established
North Carolina precedent in a quotation reproduced in full :
The presumption is that a zoning ordinance is valid and a constitutional
exercise of the police power. The burden to show otherwise rests upon
the property owner who asserts that it is invalid. Evidence that an
ordinance has made property less valuable is an insufficient ground,
standing alone, for invalidating it. "When the most that can be said
against such ordinances is that whether it was an unreasonable,
arbitrary or unequal exercise of power is fairly debatable, the courts will
not interfere." Under such circumstances the courts may not substitute
their judgment for that of the legislative body as to the wisdom of the
legislation.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 55, 197 S.E.
706, 709 (i938).
78. Id. at 640, 171 S.E.2d at 9.
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interests of society justify restraints upon individual conduct and
also upon the use to which property may be devoted. The provisions of the Constitution are not intended to so protect the individual in the use of his property as to enable him to use it to the
detriment of the public. When the uses to which the individual
puts his property conflict with the interest of society the right of
the individual is subordinated to the general welfare and incidental damage to the property resulting from governmental activities
or laws passed in promotion of the public welfare is not considered
a taking of the property for which compensation must be made. 79

Ten years later, the supreme court revisited the takings issue,
further refining and expanding the takings test in A -S-P Associates v. City of Raleigh. 80 The takings test in A -S-P remains the
test used by the North Carolina courts to this day.81
The A -S-P test was reiterated and expanded in Responsible
Citizens v. City of Asheville 82 to include the United States
Supreme Court's analysis from Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City.83 The subject of the dispute was the application
of Asheville's flood plain ordinance to the plaintiffs property.
Asheville adopted a "flood hazard" ordinance that regulated both
the uses of flood plain land and the type of new construction
allowed there. New or substantially improved existing buildings
were required to be built so as to prevent or minimize flood
damage. 84
At trial the court determined that the plaintiffs were not entitled to relief on their claim that the ordinance effected a taking of
79. Id. (quoting In re Appeal of Parker, 214 N.C. 51, 59, 197 S.E. 706 (1938».
In Parker, Justice Barnhill did note the existing uses - an office building and
bottling plant. The Justice noted the admittedly great diminution of value but
did not find it to be so severe as to work a taking. Id ..
80. 298 N.C. 207, 258 S.E.2d 444 (1979).
81. See., e.g., County of Hoke v. Byrd, 107 N.C. App. 658, 421 S.E. 2d 800
(1992). The Court of Appeals used the ASP test in its 1992 decision to decide
whether the county's junkyard regulating ordinance worked an unconstitutional
taking.
82. 308 N.C. 255, 302 S.E.2d 204 (1983).
83. Id at 266-67,302 S.E.2d at 211-12 (quoting Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978». See infra notes 95-100 and
accompanying text.
84. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 257-302, 302 S.E.2d at 206-08. The
court quoted the ordinance at length as follows:
The provisions of the ordinance which plaintiffs attack require, in
general, that new construction and substantial improvements made to
properties in the flood hazard districts be built so as to prevent or
minimize flood damage.
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Specifically, plaintiffs challenge Article 6, Section B; Article 7,
Section B; Article 8, Section B, Subsections 1-5; and Article 10, Section
B, of the ordinance.
Article 6, Section B, provides:
REQUIREMENTS
(1) All new construction and substantial improvements shall be
anchored to prevent flotation, collapse or lateral movement of the
structure.
(2) All new construction and substantial improvements shall be
constructed with materials and utility equipment reasonably resistant
to flood damage as defined in N.C. Building Code.
(3) All new construction and substantial improvements shall be
constructed by methods and practices which reasonably minimize flood
damage.
(4) All new and replacement water supply systems, either private
or public, shall be designed and installed to minimize, to the greatest
extent practicable, infiltration of flood waters into the system.
(5) All new and replacement sanitary sewerage systems, either
private or public, shall be designed and installed to minimize, to the
greatest extent practicable, infiltration of flood waters into the systems
and discharge from the systems into the flood waters.
(6) On-site waste disposal systems shall be located or constructed to
avoid impairment of them or contamination from them during flooding.
(7) Any alteration, repair, reconstruction or improvements to a
structure, on which the start of construction was begun after the
effective date of this Ordinance, shall meet the requirements of "new
construction" as contained in this Ordinance. This article applies to all
property in the flood hazard districts. Flood hazard districts are divided
into two types, "floodway districts" and "flood fringe districts."
Plaintiffs here have property in each type of flood hazard district.
Article 7, Section B, which applies in general to property in floodway
districts, provides:
REQUIREMENTS
(1) Within a designated FLOODWAY District, all fill,
encroachments, new construction or substantial improvement shall be
prohibited, except as otherwise provided herein as a Permitted use or
Conditional Use.
(2) The construction, reconstruction or improvement of any portion
of a new or existing mobile home park, the expansion of an existing
mobile home park, the placement, replacement, location and relocation
of a mobile home within a FWD are prohibited.
(3) Residential uses of buildings and lands within the Floodway
District are prohibited.
Article 8, Section B, which applies in general to property in flood fringe
, districts, Subsections 1-5, provides:
REQUIREMENTS
(1) Permits are required for all grading and construction work
within a FFD. Applications shall be made pursuant to ARTICLE 4
SECTION C of this Ordinance.
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their property without just compensation in violation of Article
one, Section nineteen of the North Carolina Constitution and the
(2) The construction, reconstruction or improvement of any portion
of a new or existing mobile home park, the expansion of an existing
mobile home park, the placem,ent, replacement, location and relocation
of a mobile home within a FFD are prohibited . .
(3) New construction or substantial improvement of any residential
structure within a FFD shall have the lowest habitable floor (including
basement) elevated to at least two feet above the Regulatory Flood
Elevation and utilities shall be floodproofed as provided by Article 10
Section A of this Ordinance.
(4) New construction or substantial improvement of any
commercial, industrial or other non-residential building shall either
have the lowest floor (including basement) elevated to at least one foot
above the Regulatory Flood Elevation and utilities shall be floodproofed
as provided by Article 10 Section A of this Ordinance or shall be
floodproofed up to at least the Regulatory Flood Elevation pursuant to
Article 10 Section B of this Ordinance and shall have utilities
floodproofed pursuant to Article 10
Section A.
(5) Outside storage of materials of inventories for allowable uses
within the Flood Fringe District and not otherwise prohibited by the
Ordinance shall be allowed.
Article
Section B, provides:
FLOODPROOFING BUILDINGS
New construction or substantial improvements of any commercial,
industrial, or other nonreside»tial structure, together with the
attendant utilities, shall be flood proofed in one of the following ways:
(a) Elevation of the lower floor, including basement above the level
of the base or regulatory flood elevation at the specific site;
(b) Be floodproofed so that below the base flood level the structure
is water tight with walls substantially impermeable to the passage of
water, with structural components having the capacity of resisting
hydrostatic and hydrodynamic loads and the effects of buoyancy;
(c) An alternative method of floodproofing structures shall be to
construct nonresidential buildings in such a manner that water shall be
allowed to pass into or through the structure with no substantial risk
that the building will thereby be endangered or be susceptible to
collapse or substantial damage. (The owners of such structure shall be
advised that improvements made under this provision shall receive a
specified rating for insurance purposes and that no subsidized insurance
will be available for goods, inventories, materials or equipment
contained in the building below the base flood elevation.) However,
before this method of flood proofing is utilized the proposed use or
construction shall be approved by the Board of Adjustment as set forth
in Article 4 of this Ordinance.
(d) An acceptable combination of methods (a)-(c).

10;

[d.
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Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 85 Prior to
consideration by the court of appeals the owners petition of discli'e~
tionary review was allowed by the supreme court.
Justice Meyer86 used the previous North Carolina Supreme
Court holdings, particularly Helms v. City of Charlotte 87 and A-SP Associates v. Raleigh 88 and the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,89
to refine and reaffirm the court's position on the taking issue.
Quoting from Justice Brock's opinion in A-S-P Associates v.
Raleigh, Justice Meyer repeated the takings test:
"Several principles must be borne in mind when considering a due
process challenge to governmental regulation of private property
on grounds that it is an invalid exercise ofthe police power. First,
is the object of the legislation within the scope of the police power?
Second, considering all the surrounding circumstances and particular facts of the case is the means by which the governmental
entity has chosen to regulate reasonable?"
In short, then, the court is to engage in an "ends-means" analysis in deciding whether a particular exercise of the police power
is legitimate. The court first determines whether the ends sought,
i.e., the object of the legislation, is within the scope of the power.
The court then determines whether the means chosen to regulate
are reasonable. Justice Brock stated that this second inquiry is
really a "two-pronged" test. That is, in determining if the means
chosen are reasonable the court must answer the following: "(1) Is
85. The North Carolina Constitution states in full:
No person shall be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold,
liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner deprived
of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land. No person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws; nor shall any person be
subjected to discrimination by the State because of race, color, religion,
or national origin.
N. C. CONST. art. I § 19. The North Carolina "law of the land" clause has the
same meaning as "due process of law" under the U.S. Constitution. Summey
Outdoor Advertising v. Town of Henderson, 96 N.C. App. 533, 541, 386 S.E.2d
439, 444 (1989) (citing Horton v. Gulledge, 277 N.C. 353, 359, 177 S.E.2d 885,
889 (1970); State v. Jones, 305 N.C. 520, 290 S.E.2d 675 (1982)). For a
comparison with the federal constitution, see supra notes 9-10 and
accompanying text.
86. Justices Frye and Martin took no part in this decision. Note their dissent
in Finch, infra notes 151-160 and accompanying text.
87. Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647,122 S.E.2d 817 (1961).
88. 298 N.C. 207, 214, 258 S.E.2d 444, 449 (1979).
89. 43'8 U.S. 104 (1978). For further discussion on this issue, see infra notes
95-101 and accompanying text.
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the statute in its application reasonably necessary to promote the
accomplishment of a public good and (2) is the interference with
the owners right to use his property as he deems appropriate reasonable in degree?90

Justice Meyer went on to explain that the supreme court's
opinion had not changed. He reiterated that: "[T]he mere fact
that an ordinance results in the depreciation of the value of an
individual's property or restricts to a certain degree the right to
develop it as he deems appropriate is not sufficient reason to
render the ordinance invalid."91
The court held that Asheville's flood hazard ordinance was
reasonably necessary to further the public goal of preventing or
reducing flood damage, reasonable as to the means chosen to
attain the goal and reasonable in the degree to which it interfered
with the use of plaintiffs property. The current use of property
was not interfered with and the owners were not prohibited from
making improvements so long as they did so in a manner that
minimized or prevented dama.ge from flooding. The ordinance was
not unconstitutional as a "taking" of property without just
compensation. 92
As to the plaintiffs argument that the flood hazard ordinance
violated the equal protection clause on the theory that it burdened
only persons who owned property in the flood hazard district for
the benefit of those owning property outside of the district, the
court held that the ordinance was not unconstitutional,93 The
court found that owners in the district were benefited by increased
protection from flooding and by the availability of federal flood
insurance and other assistance. 94
The Responsible Citizens opinion was influenced by Justice
Brennan's opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of

90. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 261-62, 302 S.E.2d at 208 (quoting
A.S.P. Assoc., 298 N.C. at 214, 302 S.E.2d at 448-49 (citations omitted)).
91. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 265,302 S.E.2d at 210-11 (quoting A-SP Associates v. City of Raleigh, 298 NC 207, 218, 258 S.E.2d 444, 451 (1979)).
See also Zopfi v. City of Wilmington, 273 N.C. 430, 160 S.E.2d 325 (1968); Helms
v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 122 S.E.2d 817 (1962).
92. Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. at 264-65,302 S.E.2d at 210-11.
93. [d. at 267-68, 302 S.E.2d at 212.
94. [d. at 268-69, 302 S.E.2d at 212-13. See Federal Flood Insurance Act of
1968, § 1315, 42 U.S.C. § 4022; Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, § 102(a),
42 U.S.C. § 4012a (a).
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New York. 95 Brennan wrote that the focus of the analysis was the
"character of the action and nature and extent of the interference
with property rights."96 Penn Central arose from the application
of New York State's Landmark Preservation Law to the plaintiff's
property, the Grand Central Terminal in New York City. The law
prevented the plaintiff from developing a skyscraper above the
terminal. The plaintiff sued, claiming that the designation of
Grand Central Terminal as a "historic landmark" worked a taking
in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 97
.
Justice Brennan could not articulate a precise test to determine if a taking had occurred, holding instead to a weighing of
factors unique to the case in question. He stated:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment has proved to he a problem of considerable diffi- ·
culty. While this Court recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's
guarantee ... [is] designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole," this Court, quite
simply, has been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that economic injuries
caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather
than remain disproportionately concentrated on a few persons.
Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether a particular
restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to
pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon ..
the particular circumstances [in that] case.,,98

Thus Justice Brennan made no pretense of formulating a test
to provide guidance to land use regulators:
.
In engaging in these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the
Court's decisions have identified several factors that have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the
governmental action. A "taking" may more readily be found when
95. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Justices Rehnquist and Stevens and Chief Justice
Burger dissented.
96. [d. at 105.
97. [d.
98. [d. at 123 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) and
United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 155, 168 (1958)) (and
citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1960); United States v. Caltex, Inc.
344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952)).
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the interference with property can be characterized as a physical
invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from
some public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good. 99

The test is thus an ad hoc one. Justice Brennan went on to
list four factors to be considered in every takings case: 1) the economic impact of the government regulation; 2) the character of the
taking, noting especially any physical invasion of private property: 3) the destruction of, or adverse impact on, property rights;
and 4) the acquisition of resources to permit or facilitate a public
use of private property.lOO These factors must be applied to the
facts of every case to see whether a taking can be found. This
application is not based on any stated, measurable criteria, but is
rather a question of how the estate claimed to be taken is defined
and the convictions of the individual justices. Until 1987, the
United States Supreme Court found no takings unless the government actually physically invaded a property interest.101 The next
section discusses the more conservative approach of the North
Carolina Supreme Court.
Up to this point in the evolution of takings law the North Carolina courts adopted a de facto presumption that a zoning ordinance is constitutional unless the challengers can show that all
economic use of their property has been eliminated. This test has
rarely if ever been met. As the A-S-P decision and the following
sections show, the enormousl~. infl.uential decision of Justice Brennan in Penn Central created a test that was much more difficult
for challengers to overcome than those articulated in Helms and
Roberson's Beverages.

v.

TAKING CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE NORTH CAROLINA
COURTS - THE LATEST CASES

In Finch v. City of Durham 102 the plaintiff sued the City of
Durham claiming that a rezoning of the plaintiffs property from
office and institutional (0_I)103 to R_10104 zoning constituted an
99. Id. at 123-24 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
100. [d.
101. See Responsible Citizens v. City of Asheville, 308 N.C. 255,302 S.E.2d 204
(1983).
102. 325 N.C. 352, 384 S.E.2d 8 (1989).
103. The zoning ordinance provides, in relevant part:
1. Specific Office-institutional District Regulations.
The following regulations shall apply in all Office-institutional districts:
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unconstitutional taking under the state and federal constitu_
tions. 105 The supreme court followed the ends-means test of A-S-p
Associates u. Raleigh .106
Consideration of the particular facts of this case is importalilt,
as the ends-means test is an ad hoc test, based on the facts of eaeh
case. The facts showed that the plaintiff owned 2.6 undeveloped
and unimproved acres at the southeast corner of Interstate 85 and
Hillandale Road. 107 Prior to 1979 the plaintiffs property was
zoned R_10.108 In 1979 the plaintiff successfully petitioned for the
property to be rezoned to 0_1.109 Also in 1979, the plaintiff began
to lease the property for $15,000 per year (with an option to
purchase) from the ownerYo In 1984 a motel developer offered tQ
buy the property from the plaintiff, provided that it could be developed as a motel. ll1 In March, 1985, the local neighborhood associ.ation petitioned the city to rezone the plaintiffs property to R-10,
in an effort to prevent non-residential development of the propertyY2 On April 2, the Durham Planning and Zoning Commis- .
sion recommend to the city council that the property be rezoned to
R-10y3 On April 29, or twenty-seven days after the planning
commission's recommendation, the plaintiff began to exercise his
option to purchase the 2.6 acres. 114 The City Council rezoned the
Permitted Uses.
2. Land shall be used and buildings erected, altered, enlarged, or used
only for one or more of the uses indicated in the 0-1 column of the Table
of Permitted Uses and subject to such conditions as may be referred to
in the Special Requirements column of said table."
DURHAM, N.C., ZONING ORDINANCE, § 24-7 B (1960, Amend. 1990).
104. Finch, 325 N.C. at 358,204 S.E.2d at 12. The land uses permitted in R-10
are single family houses, athletic fields, cemeteries, mausoleums, childcare
centers, churches, clubs or private lodges, noncommercial community buildings,
family care homes, parking lots, public buildings, libraries, museums, art
galleries, parks, recreational facilities, public or private swimming pools and
schools. [d.
105. [d. at 357-58, 304 S.E.2d at 11-12.
106. 298 N.C. 207,258 S.E.2d 444 (1979). For a discussion of the A-S-P case,
see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
107. Finch, 325 N.C. at 355, 304 S.E.2d at 10.
108. [d.
109. [d. at 356, 384 S.E.2d at 11.
110. [d.
111. [d.
112. [d.
113. [d.
114. [d.
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plaintiffs property from 0-1 to R-10 on May 6.115 Despite the
city's rezoning action, the plaintiff purchased the property on June
26 for $165,000 and in July entered into a contract to sell the
property for $500,000 to the motel developerP6
At trial the jury found that the rezoning ordinance was an
invalid taking, but that the plaintiff suffered no damages. The
trial judge granted plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 117 to award damages.n s The plaintiff was also
awarded attorneys fees and costS. 119 Both. parties appealed. 120
Before the court of appeals could hear the case, the supreme court
granted discretionary review ex mero motu. 121
In his opinion for the majority122 Justice Meyer applied the
ends-means test. The court stressed that, "the mere fact that an
ordinance results in the depreciation of the value of an individuals
property or restricts to a certain degree the right to develop it as
he seems appropriate is not sufficient reason to render the ordinance invalid"123 and cited authority to show that in other jurisdictions "even a one hundred percent diminution in property value
does not necessarily constitute a taking."124 However, in North
Carolina the "cases speak in terms of 'practical use' and 'reasonable value' following the rezoning.... "125
In applying the ends-means test, the court emphasized the
"investment backed expectations" of the plaintiff.126 One relevant
factor in analyzing these expectations is the timing of the acquisition of property in relation to the regulatory action. 127 The court
115.Id.
116. Id. at 357, 384 S.E.2d at 11-12.
117. Id. See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § lA-I, Rule 56 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
118. Finch 325 N.C. at 362, 384 S.E.2d at 14.
119.Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. The Latin phrase means "of his own accord." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
517 (5th ed. 1979). Significantly, the supreme court granted discretionary review
and bypassed the court of appeals in Responsible Citizens and River Birch Assoc.
v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 388 S.E.2d 538 (1990). See supra text and
accompanying notes 85-98.
122. Justices Frye and Webb joined in Chief Justice Exum's dissent.
123. Finch, 325 N.C. at 364, 384 S.E.2d at 15 (quoting A.S.P., 298 N.C. at 218,
258 S.E.2d at 451).
124. Finch , 325 N.C. at 366, 384 S.E.2d at 16.
125. Id. North Carolina courts at least impliedly examine what is left after the
regulation is applied in order to judge whether a taking has occurred.
126. Id. at 366-67, 384 S.E .2d at 16-17.
127. Id .
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repeated the rule of investments occurring after a regulation ·is
enacted: "[W]here an investor knows of a pending ordinance
change proposed by a city planning board to a city council, the
investor has no valid claim that he relied upon the prior ordinance
in guiding his investment decision."128 In this case, the plaintiW
exercised his option to purchase the property on April 29, twenty_
seven days after the plaintiff "knew of the recommendation by the
Durham Planning and Zoning Commission to rezone the property
to R_10."129 The court concluded that the plaintiffs expectations of
investment return were in fact based on a speculative risk tha~
the Durham City Council would not rezone the property to prehibit the proposed ... project."130
.
As the outcome of the ends-means test is dependent on the
facts of a given case arid the judicial interpretation of those factE!,
it is necessary to examine how the court has applied the test in
each case. In Finch, the court first asked if a nexus existed
between the goals of the rezoning ordinance and the rezoning ordinance itself. · The rule by which the validity of the zoning ordinance was judged is well settled under North Carolina law. As
the court in Finch stated, "A zoning ordinance will be declare'd
invalid only where the record demonstrates that it bears no suostantial relation to the public health . . . or the public welfare
.... "131 Furthermore, the court noted that "the burden of proof of
establishing the invalidity of a zoning ordinance is on the complaining party."132
The court held that the city's goal to protect residential neighborhoods by maintaining a clear dividing line between residential
and commercial uses was valid because if even one commercial
use was allowed south of 1-85, "a 'domino effect tends to occur in
that commercial areas grow into strip areas which contribute to
the degeneration of a residential neighborhood."133
The plaintiff presented no evidence to the contrary. The court
found that the plaintiffs promises of limited impacts from the proposed motel development were not enough: "Durham . .. cannot
128. Id. See also In re Campsites Unlimited, Inc., 287 N.C. 493, 215 S.E.2d73
(1975); Stowe v. Burke, 255 N.C. 257, 122 S.E.2d 374 (1961).
129. Finch, 325 N.C. at 367,384 S.E.2d at 17.
130. Id.
131. Id. (quoting Graham v. City of Raleigh, 55 N.C. App. 107, 110,284 S.E.2d
742, 744 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 305 N.C. 299, 290 S.E.2d 702 (1982)).
132. Finch, 325 N.C. at 367-68, 384 S.E.2d at 17-18.
133. Id. at 368, 384 S.E.2d at 18.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss3/5

22

Benshoff: Out of Focus: The Fuzzy Line between Regulatory "Takings" and Val

1994]

TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

355

be expected to ba!?e zoning decisions on the promises of one potential developer."134 The court stated that "the 0&1 zoning would
have permitted any hotel to develop on the property."135 The
court concluded that the rezoning ordinance met the first part of
the ends-means test, stating "a sufficient nexus exists between
the goals of the rezoning ordinance and the ordinance itself, ...
and the ordinance has sufficient foundation in reason and bears a
substantial relation to the public welfare."136
The second part of the ends-means test, whether the means
chosen to regulate were reasonable, requires analyzing whether
the rezoning ordinance deprives the plaintiff of all practical use of
the property and renders it of no reasonable value. 137 "The burden is on the plaintiffs to make .such a showing."138 The court
found that "[the] evidence fails to support the notion that plaintiffs property had no practical use or reasonable value."139 The
court cited three reasons for reaching this conclusion. First, the
testimony of the plaintiffs experts was "equivocal."140 The experts
testified that the property had no reasonable value compared to
the purchase price of $165,000, yet the experts also testified that a
church might pay $100,000 to $200,000 for the property.141 The
plaintiff testified that he had been approached by a day care
center which offered to buy the property for $100,000 to
$150,000. 142 Next, the plaintiff never submitted a rezoning
request or a "proposed development plan" to the city.143 The evidence showed that the planning department staff recommended
two more intense zoning districts than R-lO for the subject property: Limited Office and Institutional (O-I-L) and medium density
cluster residential development. 144 Finally, the plaintiff did not
134. [d. The court does not mention it, but this type of arrangement also raises
the issue of contract zoning, which is illegal in North Carolina. See Blades v.
Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 187 S.E.2d 35 (1971); Allred v. City of Raleigh, 277 N.C.
530, 178 S.E.2d 432 (1970).
135. Finch, 325 N.C. at 368,384 S.E.2d at 18. See also Hall v. City of Durham,
323 N.C. 293, 372 S.E.2d 564 (1988).
136. Finch , 325 N.C. 368, 384 S.E.2d at 18.
137. [d. at 368-69, 384 S.E.2d at 18.
138. [d. at 369, 384 S.E.2d at 18.
139. [d. at 370, 384 S.E.2d at 19.
140. [d.
141. [d.
· 142. [d.
143. [d.
144. [d. The latter use, medium density cluster residential, was characterized
as "ideal" by the city's Associate Director of Current Planning.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

23

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 5

356

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:333

show that the property could not be developed under R-I0 .. The
plaintiff only showed a potential loss. The plaintiff showed no evidence of seeking contributions from adjacent property owners Who
could have benefited from improvements the developer woulQ
have to make to the site prior to development. 145
The court defined the real gravamen of the plaintiffs com.plaint as "the available uses and value of [the] property under the
R-I0 zoning are not comparable to its value for motel use under 0I, in either market appeal or ... price."146 Expressed another way,
the plaintiffs real argument according to the court was that tl;lE~ RIO zoning does not guarantee a certain return on investm~nt;
therefore, it is neither a practical nor a reasonable use of the property. The court stated emphatically that this argument has n~
basis in North Carolina law: "[A] rezoning ordinance [that]
results in some substantial depreciation of the value of the plaintiffs property or restricts their right to develop it as they wish is
[not] invalid."147
The court concluded that the rezoning ordinance met the second part of the ends-means test because the "plaintiffs own evidence [showed] that several uses permitted under R-I0 zoning
could be made of the property, such as residential, day care, or
church . .. " and that the "plaintiffs' evidence showed that the
property could have been sold as undeveloped for between $20,000
and $25,000 at the time of the trial."148 Finally, the court held
that "the rezoning of plaintiffs' property does not amount to a taking under the North Carolina Constitution or the United States
Constitution."149 The judgment of the trial court was reversed,
and the case was remanded to the superior: court. 150
145. [d. In order to develop the property into six R-10 lots, Chesterfield Street
would have to be opened and improved at a cost of $121,000. Chesterfield Street
exists only on paper. It borders the east side of the plaintiffs property. If
Chesterfield Street were opened, the adjacent property owner could build 7 R-10
lots on his property. At least theoretically, the plaintiff and the neighboring
property owner could have shared the costs of improving Chesterfield Street.
The plaintiffs six lots were estimated to be worth $81,000. Thus, under this
scenario, the plaintiff would not recover the price paid for the property.
However, it is not true that the property has no value.
146. [d.
147. [d. at 371, 384 S.E.2d at 19. See also Responsible Citizens, 308 N.C. 255,
265, 302 S.E.2d 204, 210 (1983).
148. Finch, 325 N.C. at 371, 384 S.E.2d at 19.
149. [d. at 371-72, 384 S.E.2d at 19-20.
150. [d. at 374, 384 S.E.2d at 19-20.
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Writing for the dissent, Chief Justice Exum agreed with the
majority that the ends-means test was the correct legal test, yet
disagreed that it had been correctly applied by the majority.151
Exum wrote that the key to the proper application of the test is
the understanding of the terms "reasonable" and "practical" as
they relate to the value of the subject property.152
According to the dissent, the issue was "whether there is evidence in the case which ; . . is sufficient to support the jury's determination that the rezoning deprived plaintiffs of all practical use
of their property so it had no reasonable value."153 Exum supported the jury's finding at trial, agreeing with plaintiffs' evidence
showing that "none of the possible [R-10] uses were reasonable,
practical or beneficial because there was very little, if any, market
for these uses."154 The dissent believed that the majority's holding
that the plaintiff should have tried to persuade the city to rezone
the property before suing was unnecessary: "[A]n unsuccessful
partition to rezone should not be a prerequisite to the plaintiffs'
challenge to the present zoning ordinance as an unconstitutional
taking."155
To the dissent, the plaintiffs' witnesses' testimony validly
established that the property had no "practical value" or any "beneficial use".156 The witnesses established that the property before
rezoning was worth $550,000 and that after rezoning it was worth
$20,000 to $25,000. 157 Thus the plaintiffs' evidence carried the
burden of proof for summary judgment, having presented sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude "that the rezoning had deprived plaintiffs of all practical use of the property so
that it had no reasonable value."158
To the dissent there was enough evidence to make out a jury
question, but not enough evidence to reach a conclusion as a matter of law on the issue of damages. 159 The dissent concluded that
the proper outcome of the court's deliberations should have been
151. Id. at 380, 384 S.E.2d at 22. Justices Frye and Webb concurred in the
dissent. Justice Frye also wrote a separate dissenting opinion, which is not
discussed in this article.
152. ld. at 381, 384 S.E.2d at 23.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 382, 384 S.E.2d at 24.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 385-86, 384 S.E.2d at 26-27.
157. Id. at 383, 384 S.E.2d at 24.
158. Id. at 386, 3M S.E.2d at 27 (emphasis in original).
159. Id.
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to affirm the trial court's entry of judgment as to a taking, but to
vacate the plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict on the question of damages and order a new trial to con.
sider the question of damages. 160
.
In Finch, both the majority and the dissent focused on what
was left to the plaintiffs after the promulgation of the regulation.
Analyzing the same facts, the majority found that an eighty-eight
per cent I61 decrease in value was not enough to find a taking.
The dissent held that a jury could conclude that a large decrease
in the remainder of the estate was a regulatory taking. The only
certainty that can be gleaned from this decision is that there is no
certainty as to what constitutes a taking, and that the North Carolina courts are reluctant to find a purely regulatory taking.
Summey Outdoor Advertising v. County of Henderson 162 held
that a sign control ordinance I63 which rendered thirty-two of the
plaintiffs outdoor advertising signs non-conforming did not constitute an unconstitutional taking. 164 The ordinance regulated the
height, size, number of sides and faces per sign, distance from the
road and distance from other signs of all off-premise signs165 not
located on interstate, federal or primary highways.166 The ordinance allowed "existing nonconforming signs to be brought into
compliance or removed within five years."167 No direct monetary
compensation was provided for the removal of signs after the end
160. Id. at 388, 384 S.E.2d at 27.
161. Eighty-eight per cent is the difference between the purchase price paid by
plaintiffs of $165,000 and the value after rezoning of $20,000. The percentage
difference between the potential sales price of $550,000 and $20,000 is 96.4%.
162. 96 N.C. App. 533, 386 S.K2d 439 (1989).
163. The General Assembly has considered many and passed several bills
restricting local government's authority to regulate signs using the police power.
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-131.1 (1987 & Supp. 1990) The General Assembly
enacted a law requiring just compensation for the removal of billboards on
federal primary highways by local authorities. As originally adopted in 1981,
this section was to expire in 1985. In 1982, 1983, 1987 and 1988 the General
Assembly adopted amendments to this section extending the effective date of this
section. In 1989 the General Assembly passed a bill extending the date to 1994.
There is no reason to believe that the General Assembly will not continue to
extend the effective date of this section indefinitely.
164. Summey, N.C. App. at 543,386 S.E.2d at 445.
165. Id. at 535, 386 S.E.2d at 441. Off-premise signs are those signs "not
advertising a business located on the same lot or parcel as the sign." Id.
166. Id. at 535-37, 386 S.E.2d at 441-42.
167. Id. at 536, 386 S.E.2d at 441.
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of the five year "amortization period."168 Among other issues, the
plaintiff claimed that the ordinance was an oppressive and arbitrary violation of due process of law under a takings theory and on
general due process grounds.169
The court of appeals used the ends-means test to analyze
whether a taking had occurred. 170 At the beginning of its analysis
the court repeated the rule on depreciation of value due to regulation, stating that a loss of value is not a sufficient reason to hold
the ordinance invalid. 171 In applying the facts to the ends-means
test 172 the court found the sign ordinance to be within the scope of
the state's police power. 173 The court found the ordinance to be
reasonable, stating that "size, height, location, state of repair and
manner of display restrictions in outdoor advertising signs are
reasonably · necessary to promote traffic safety, prevent fire
ha.z ards or obstructions oflight, air and visibility."174
The court concluded that the ordinance did not unreasonably
interfere with plaintiff's "right to use the property as he deems
fit."175 The plaintiff was not prevented from owning and operating
outdoor advertising signs. The plaintiff could obtain permits for
all of his outdoor advertising signs so long as the signs complied
with the restrictions. 176 The ordinance placed no unreasonable
restrictions on the plaintiff.177 Finally, the court held that the
cost of complying with the ordinance could not be equated with
any inference with · the plaintiff's right to use the property
(signs).178 Therefore, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.
168. [d.
169. [d. at 541, 386 S.E.2d at 444.
170. [d. at 542, 386 S.E.2d 445-46 (citing Responsible Citizens v. City of
Asheville, 308 N.C. 255, 261-262, 302 S.E.2d 204, 208 (1983).
171. [d. (citing A.S.P., Assoc. v. City of Raleigh, 298 N.C. 207 218, 258 S.E.2d
444, 451 (1979» .
172. See supra text accompanying note 90 (providing the entire text of the endmeans test).
173. ' Summey, 96 N.C. App. at 542, 386 S.E.2d at 445.
174. [d.
175. [d.
176. [d.
177. [d. Under § 402.8A of the ordinance the maximum size of signs was
limited to 380 square feet. "Sign structures" were allowed to have two sides per
structure, with one face per side. Sign structures had to be set back 25 feet from
paved roads or 35 feet from the centerline of unpaved roads. Signs had to located
at least 1,000 feet from each other. [d. ,
178. [d.

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

27

L

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 5

360

.. 1

CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:333

The most important North Carolina case in this area is Batch
v. Town of Chapel Hill. 179 In Batch, the plaintiff maintained that
the town's requirement that she dedicate right of way for a road 180
as a condition of subdivision approval would severely diminish the
value of her property and was an uncompensated taking. While
the trial court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, Dr.
Deidre Batch, and the court of appeals partially affirmed,181 the
supreme court reversed the case on discretionary review.182
The answer: to any takings issue case depends on the particular facts of the case and Batch is no exception. In 1983, the Town
of Chapel Hill validly adopted a thoroughfare plan under the
authority of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-174.183 The plan showed that
179. 92 N.C. App. 601, 376 S.E. 2d 22 (1989), rev'd, 326 N.C. 1,387 S.E. 2d 655
(1990), cert. den., 110 S. Ct. 2631 (1990).
180. Two different North Carolina statutes permit municipalities to require
right of way dedication before granting development permits. They are N.C.
Gen. Stat. §§ 372 Subdivisions (1987, Supp. 1990) and 136-66.10 and 136-66.11
(1987, Supp. 1990) (Providing for dedication conjunction with mapping and
reserving future highway corridors.).
181. [d.
182. [d.
183. The North Carolina Legislature has defined a city's ordinance making
ability as follows:
(a) A city may by ordinance define, prohibit, regulate, or abate acts,
omissions, or conditions, detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of
its citizens and the peac~ and dignity of the city, and may define and
abate nuisances.
(b) A city ordinance shall be consistent with the Constitution and laws
of North Carolina and of the United States. An ordinance is not
consistent with State or federal· law when:
(1) The ordinance infringes a liberty guaranteed to the people by
the State or federal Constitution;
(2) The ordinance makes unlawful an act, omission or condition
which is expressly made lawful by State or federal law;
(3) The ordinance makes lawful an act, omission, or condition
which is expressly made unlawful by State or federal law;
(4) The ordinance purports to regulate a subject that cities are
expressly forbidden to regulate by State or federal law;
(5) The ordinance purports to regulate a field for which a State or
federal statute clearly shows a legislative intent to provide a
complete and integrated regulatory scheme to the exclusion of local
regulation;
(6) The elements of an offense defined by a city ordinance are
identical to the elements of an offense defined by Stat or federal law.
The fact that a State or federal law, standing alone, makes a given act,
omission, or condition unlawful shall not preclude city ordinances
requiring a higher standard of conduct or condition.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol16/iss3/5

28

Benshoff: Out of Focus: The Fuzzy Line between Regulatory "Takings" and Val

1994]

TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE

361

a Laurel Hill Parkway was to be built south of Chapel Hill, crossing land that the plaintiff ultimately purchased in 1984. 184 In
1986 Batch attempted to subdivide the 20.16 acres she purchased
into eleven residential lots. 185 The eleven lots as developed would
have surrounded two cul-de-sacs to be built on the property, and
construction of the proposed parkway by the town would have significantly interfered with the use of at least four of the anticipated
lots. 186 The Town Council denied the plaintiffs request to subdivide following the recommendations of both the Planning Department staff and the Planning Board. 187 In denying Batch's
subdivision, the Town Council passed a resolution stating that the
proposed subdivision [d]id not have streets which coordinate with
existing and planned streets and highways. 188
Sitting as an appellate court on a writ of certiorari, the superior court found no genuine issue of material fact concerning the
town's rationale for denying the subdivision permit, and issued
summary judgment for the plaintiff. 189 The superior court
rejected the town council's rationale for rejecting the application
and found that the plaintiffs application Was denied because the
plaintiff refused to accede to the town's demands for dedication of
a right-of-way for Laurel Hill Parkway and Old Lystra Road. 190
The trial court found that the denial of the subdivision application
was unconstitutional. 191 The court of appeals affirmed, stating,
"the town's denial of Dr. Batch's permit amounted to an unconstitutional taking . . . . The imposition of the 'Parkway condition,'
i.e., what it found to be a compulsory dedication requirement,
exceeded the statutory authority granted to the [t]own .. . in N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 160A-174."192 The court of appeals affirmed summary
judgment for the "Parkway condition" but reversed and remanded
summary judgment for the "Old Lystra Road condition."193

----------------------------------------------------N.C. GEN. STAT 160A-174 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
184. Batch, 326 N.C. at 4-5, 387 S.E.2d at 657-58.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 5, 387 S.E.2d at 657.
187. Id. at 7-8, 387 S.E.2d at 659-60.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 9, 387 S.E.2d at 660.
190. Id. See supra proposed subdivision plat map. The town planning staff
and planning board members wanted Batch to dedicate and improve the western
half of the Old Lystra Road right-of-way bordering the east side of her property.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 10-11, 387 S.E.2d at 661-662.
193. Id. at 11, 387 S.E.2d at 662.
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The supreme court took issue with the trial court's decision to
grant summary judgment for the plaintiff. "The sole question
before the trial court regarding this. . . proceeding was whether
the decision of the Town Council . . . was based upon findings of
fact supported by competent evidence and whether such findings
support the conclusions reached by the town."194 The court stated
that if even one of the town council's conclusions was accurate,
summary judgment should not follow. 195
The court noted that at the town council meeting the proposed
subdivision map was overlaid with the proposed parkway map.
"This evidence alone is sufficient to support the findings contained
in the second reason for the town's denial of the permit the court
found."196 The court concluded its consideration of whether the
town properly denied the subdivision application for failure to
comply with the thoroughfare plan by stating: "The Chapel Hill
ordinance expressly requires that subdivision plans for streets
and driveways shall be in compliance with and coordinate to
Chapel Hill's transportation plan. We hold that the failure to
comply with this ordinance is a sufficient basis to support the
council's refusal to approve plaintiffs subdivision plan."197
The next issue considered by the Court was whether the Town
had the authority to impose street dedication and improvement
requirements and whether the town's resolution denying the permit was unconstitutionally vague. 198 The court found that the
General Assembly had granted municipalities the authority to
coordinate the development of streets:
194. [d. at 12, 387 S.E.2d at 662.
195. [d.
196. Batch, 326 N.C. at 12-13, 387 S.E.2d at 662-663. The Town Council's
resolution stated, "The Council find.s that the development, as proposed ... [d]oes
not have streets which coordinate with existing and planned streets and
highways as required by Sections 7.7.1 and 6.5.1 ofthe Development Ordinance."
[d. at 7,387 S.E.2d at 659.
197. Batch, 326 N.C. at 13, 387 S.E.2d at 663. See Liles v. City of Gresham, 672
P.2d 1229 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Board of City Commrs, Etc. v. Gaster, 401 A.2d
666 (Md. 1979); Seal v. Mapleton City, 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979). See generally
MANDELKER, LAND USE LAw § 9.09 (2d ed. 1988) (explaining the scope of
subdivision control legislation) . The relevant portion of Chapel Hill's
Development Ordinance reads: "[T]he various streets ... serving a subdivision
should be sized and located in conformity with the Comprehensive Plan."
CHAPEL HILL, N. C., DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE § 17.7.1 (1991) (recodifying former
CHAPEL HILL, N.C., DEVELOPMENT ORDINANCE § 6.5.1).
198. Batch, 326 N.C. at 13, 387 S.E.2d at 663.
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Under N.C.G.S. § 160A-372, a town is clearly authorized to
require a developer to take future as well as present road development into account when designing a subdivision. A requirement
that a subdivision design accommodate future road plans is not
necessarily tantamount to compulsory dedication. Rather, such a
requirement might legitimately compel a developer to anticipate
planned road development in some logical manner when designing
a proposed subdivision. 199

Thus the court found that denying the plaintiffs subdivision permit for failing to take future road plans into account was not
unconstitutionally vague. 200
In rejecting her claim the North Carolina Supreme Court
stated that the plaintiffs federal claim had no effect on the court's
holding. 201 Its decision was based solely upon adequate and
independent state grounds, without resort to federallaw. 202 This
statement established that the court's opinion was based solely on
199. [d. The governing statute reads in relevant part:

A subdivision control ordinance may provide for the orderly growth
and development of the city; for the coordination of streets and
highways within proposed subdivisions with existing or planned streets
and highways and with other public facilities- for the dedication or
reservation of . . . rights-of-way or easements for street and utility
purposes including the dedication of rights-of-way pursuant to G.S. 13610 or G.S. 136-11; and for the distribution of population and traffic in a
manner that will avoid congestion and overcrowding and will create
conditions essential to public nealth, safety, and the general welfare.
The ordinance may include requirements that the final plat show
sufficient data to determine readily and reproduce accurately on the
ground the location, bearing, and length of every street and alley line,
lot line, easement boundary line, and other property boundaries,
including the radius and other data for curved property lines, to an
appropriate accuracy and in conformance with good surveying
practice ....
The ordinance may require a combination of partial payment of
funds and partial dedication of constructed streets when the governing
body of the city determines that a combination is in the best interests of
the citizens of the area to be served.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-372 (1987).
200. Batch, 326 N.C. at 14, 387 S.E.2d at 663.
201. [d. at 15, 387 S.E.2d at 664. See University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478
U.S. 788 (1986) (holding that state court judgments must be given both issue and
claim preclusive effect in subsequent 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions).
202. Batch, 326 N.C. at 15, 387 S.E.2d at 664. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983). In Michigan v. Long, the United States Supreme Court overturned
a Michigan Supreme Court ruling based on the state court's interpretation of
federal law. As the state court's interpretation of federal law was in error and
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state law and thus could not be overturned by the United States
Supreme Court as a flawed interpretation of federal law.
Batch is important for the proposition that the supreme court
will uphold exactions authorized by the General Assembly. Note
that there was no dissent in Batch. Also, it is important that the
supreme court was careful to provide the United States Supreme
Court no grounds for review. Given the federal high Court's
recent holdings in takings law, a case such as this could be
reversed on appeal. 203
Between the time that the court of appeals and the North
Carolina Supreme Court heard Batch, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals heard another exactions case, Franklin Road Properties v. City of Raleigh. 204 The court of appeals again applied the
ends-means test to determine if an exaction required in order to
obtain a building permit was lawful. 205
As in all applications of the ends-means test, the specific facts
of the case must be exposited in order to understand how the court
applied the facts to the ends-means test. In March, 1983, the
plaintiff in Franklin Road requested two variances from the City
of Raleigh in order to develop · a three building office condominia
project on Jones-Franklin Road on land zoned Office & Institutional III (0&1 111).206 One variance was to decrease the miniwas based on federal and not state case law, Justice O'Connor opined that the
Michigan Supreme Court's o'pinion could not stand.
203. See infra part VII.
204. 94 N.C. App. 731, 381 S.E.2d 487 (1989)
205. [d. at 736, 381 S.E.2d at 491.
206. [d. at 732, 381 S.E.2d at 4~8. The city ordinance at issue in this case
reads as follows:
(a) Approval If the use requires a site plan, as set forth in 102132.2,
approval of a preliminary site plan is required by either the
administrative staff or the City Council; see 1O-2132.2(b) and (c). If the
use requires a plot plan, as set forth in 10-2132.1, administrative
approval is required. All general uses, conditional uses, and special
uses, allowed in the Office and Institution-3 District are listed in the
Schedule of Permitted Uses in Zoning Districts, 10-2071. Some of the
uses permitted in the District include the following: (1) General uses.
- Bank
- Cemetery
- Church, synagogue or religious education building
- Civic club
- Funeral home
- Hospital (medical/psychiatric/veterinary)
_ . Library, art gallery or museum - governmental
- Parking lot, deck, garage
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-

Radio and television studio
Recreational uses - governmental
School (elementary, middle, and high) including colleges,
technical and vocational institution, and specialty school but
excluding private or parochial school
- Utility services and substations
(2) Conditional uses.
See 10-2072 for provisions applicable to each conditional use.
- Dance, recording, music studio
- Day care facility (child or adult)
- Governmental building and grounds
- Home occupation located in dwellings established-prior to
application of this zoning district
(c) -Office agency and studio of a professional or business agent, or
political, labor, or service association listed as allowed in the Schedule of
Permitted Land Uses in Zoning Districts, 102071.
ice center
- Private or parochial school (elementary, middle, and high)
- Recreational use - restricted to membership profit and not for
profit
- Unit ownership condominium)
Cross References: Office center and unit ownership (condominium)
developments are conditional uses; however, their regulation as are set
forth in Articles F ad G of this chapter and not in 10-2072.
(3) Special Uses
a See 10-2144 for special uses approved by the Board of Adjustment.
- Airfield, landing strip, and heliport
- Limited home business located in dwellings established prior to
application of this zoning district
- Nonresidential related service, including eating establishments
without drive-thru service or drive-in service
(4) Other professional or service offices, studios or agencies not
otherwise listed as allowed in the office district by the Schedule of
Permitted Land Uses in Zoning Districts, 102071
- Manufacturing- specialized
(b.) See 10-214S for special uses approved by the Raleigh City Council.
- Outdoor stadium, outdoor theater, outdoor race track with more
than two hundred and fifty (250) seats; outdoor movie
- Telecommunications tower
(c) Prohibited Uses
Except for improvements made pursuant to Part 10 chapter 3 of this
Code, any use not explicitly allowed in the Office and Institution-3
District by the Schedule of Permitted land Uses in Zoning Districts 102071 is prohibited. The enumeration of expressly prohibited uses shall
not be deemed exclusive or all-inclusive. Prohibited uses include:
- Adult establishments
- Any retail store or shop for public customers, including an artist
studio, eating establishment, beauty shop, tailor shop that is not
otherwise specified.
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mum allowed building setback from the road right-of way to less
than 50 feet.207 The second variance was to allow parking in the
reduced setback. 208 The city council granted both variances and
approved the plaintiffs development plan, called a "site plan."209
When the plaintiff applied for building permits in order to begin
construction, the city department of inspection refused to issue
the permits until the plaintiff agreed to dedicate land to widen
and pave part of Jon~s-Franklin Road. 210
The plaintiff filed a complaint seeking as one of the causes of
action that two zoning ordinance sections in Raleigh's City Code,
§§ 10-2063 211 and 10-3018,212 be declared in violation of Article
RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part 10, Planning & Development § 102037 (1982 & Supp. 1991).
207. Franklin Road, 94 N.C. App. at 732,381 S.E.2d at 487.
208. Id .
209. Id .
210. Id. at 732-33, 381 S.E.2d at 488-89.
211. This section is part of the Zoning Ordinance. The relevant ordinance text
is:
(2) Yard
The minimum district yard setbacks, unless otherwise required by this
Code. are front yard 50 feet protective yard when the yard setback
adjoins any residential district, dwelling, congregate care or congregate
living structure or if the setback adjoins a street right-of-way and
immediately across this street is a residential district, dwelling,
congregate care or congreJ ate living structure
50 feet protective yard when the yard setback adjoins a street right-ofway and immediately across this street is a residential district,
dwelling, congregate care or congregate living structure
RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part 10, Planning & Development § 102063 (1982 & Supp. 1991).
212. This is the Subdivision Ordinance. The section reads as follows :
Whenever a .tract of land included within any proposed subdivision or
site plan embraces any part of a freeway, expressway, collector street,
major access corridor as .defined in section 10-2002, major or minor
thoroughfare so designated on the current city comprehensive plan or
thoroughfare plan after such plan or part of it has be adopted by the
proper authority, such part of such proposed public way shall be platted
and dedicated in the location and the width indicated on the city plan
but no tract shall be required to plat more than one hundred and ten
(110) feet of right-of-way, excluding slope easements.
RALEIGH, N.C. CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part 10, Planning & Development, § 103018 (1982 & Supp. 1991). Note that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 160A-296 grants
municipalities the authority to require dedication of rights-of-way. The state
statute does not limit the right-of-way width to 110 feet as does Raleigh.
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one, section nineteen, of the North Carolina Constitution and
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 213 The
plaintiff also sought damages for the unlawful taking of his property without payment of just compensation as required by law.214
The trial court granted the City of Raleigh's motion for summary
judgment.215
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Wells opined that the
plaintiff was estopped from attacking the validity of the zoning
ordinance as the plaintiff had accepted the variances granted by
the council under section 10-2063 (b).216 Judge Wells repeated the
rule as "the 'a cceptance of benefits under a statute or ordinance
precludes an attack upon it."217 The result of accepting benefits
from and then attacking a land use regulation is that, "[a] party
may, by ... her conduct, be estopped to assert both statutory and
constitutional rights."218
In considering whether the application of the subdivision was
an unconstitutional taking, the court of appeals defined "exaction"219 as a preface to stating that, "not all exactions are uncon213. Franklin Road, 94 N.C. App. at 733, 381 S.E.2d at 489.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. This section, in relevant part:
(b) Upon the council's apprqyal of a thoroughfare plan for the city and
upon the definite location of a thoroughfare of any type, all yard spaces
and building setback lines shall be calculated from the new right-of-way
lines established pursuant to the approved thoroughfare plan; provided
that when the calculation of yard spaces and building setback lines from
the new thoroughfare right-of way lines appears to the council to
deprive the owner of property abutting the thoroughfare right-way of
the reasonable use of his property, the council may grant a variance
from ' the standard requirements of the zoning and subdivision
ordinances upon certain conditions and may authorize the issuance of
building permits consistent with such variances and conditions:
RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part 10, Planning & Development § 102063(b) (1982 & Supp. 1991).
217. Franklin Road, 94 N.C. App. at 734-35, 381 S.E.2d at 489-90 (quoting
Goforth Properties, Inc. v. Town of Chapel Hill, 71 N.C. App. 771,323 S.E.2d 427
(1984».
218. Id. at 735,381 S.E.2d at 490 (quoting Goforth, 71 N.C. App. at 773, 323
S.E.2d at 429).
219. Id. at 736, 381 S.E.2d at 490. They defined "exaction" as a condition of
development permission that requires a public facility or improvement to be
provided at the developer's expense. [d.
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stitutional takings."220 The court then repeated the ends-means
test found in Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill. 221 Finally, the coa~t
held that the subdivision ordinance as applied by the city was an
exaction. Therefore, summary judgment was not the appropriate
remedy.222 The court remanded the takings issue for further consideration by the trial court.223 The court of appeals believed that
this case presented the same issue as the court had considered i'lil
Batch v. Chapel Hill. The court believed that it was compelled tc!>
issue the same ruling as it had in Batch. 224 This case would
doubtless come out differently today, since the North Carolina
Supreme Court's opinion ultimately reversed Batch. 225
The final case recently considered by the N.C. Supreme Court
is River Birch Associates v. City of Raleigh. 226 In River Birch a
Raleigh developer attempted to obtain approval to build dwellings
on three acres previously reserved by the developer as open space
in order to win approval of the development from the city council. 227 The developer and plaintiffs initial application for subdivision and site plan approval showed 144 townhouses on 19.6 acres.:
Of the total 19.6 acres, three acres were labeled as "common open
space."228 The City of Raleigh Zoning Ordinance requires that ten
per cent of the area of a townhouse development be reserved as
220. Id. (quoting Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601, 613, 376
S.E.2d 22, 30 (1989) and Richard D. Drucker, "Taking" Found for Beach Access
Dedication Requirement, 30 LOCAL Gov'T LAw BULLETIN 2 (Inst. of Gov't) (1987».
221. Id. at 736, 381 S.E.2d 491. The statement of the "ends-means" test by th~
court of appeals in Batch is worth repeating for the brevity of the formulation. In.
toto it is:
To determine whether an exaction amounts to an unconstitutional
taking, the court shall: (1) identify the condition imposed; (2) identify
the regulation which caused the condition to be imposed; (3) determine
whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state
interest. If the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state
interest, the court shall then determine (4) whether the condition
imposed advances that interest; and (5) whether the condition imposed
is proportionally related to the impact of the development.)
Batch, 92 N.C. App. at 621,376 S.E.2d at 34.
222. Franklin Road, 94 N.C. App. at 737,381 S.E.2d at 491. SeeN.C.R. CIV. P.
56.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
226. 326 N.C. 100, 388 S.E.2d 538 (1990) . .
227. Id. at 103-104, 388 S.E.2d at 539-40.
228. Id. at 104, 388 S.E.2d at 540. This was a typical development requiring
subdivision and site plan approval. It was not a planned unit development. As of
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"open space."229 The plaintiffs developed and sold townhouses in
eight sections. Each individual section contained at least ten per
cent open space, not including the three acres reserved as "common open space."230 Before selling any property, a subdivision
plat of each section was approved by the City and recorded by the
Wake County Register of Deeds. 231 The covenants prepared by
the developer "specifically stated that common area is to be held
by the Home Owners Association for the common use and enjoyment of the subdivision home owners."232 The covenants did not
refer to the three acre parcel. 233
The first seven sections of town houses were developed in
accord with the plans approved by the city, until only the three
acre parcel of "common open space" remained. 234 In December of
1985 the plaintiff filed a new site plan depicting twenty-nine town
houses (later reduced to twenty-four) on the three acre parcel in
controversy. The proposed development was called Marsh Creek
Townes. 235 The following September, the city council refused to
process the site plan application because the three acre parcel was
set aside as "common recreation area for the [townhouse development] subdivision plan approved by the City."236 The city
requested that the developer convey the three acres to the homeowners association. 237
The developer then filed suit against the city, claiming that
section 10-3073 238 of the city code exceeded the city's statutory
this writing, Raleigh has not approved a planned unit development although one
is currently being considered by the city council.
229. Id.
230. Id.
23l. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 105, 388 S.E.2d at 540.
235. Id. at 105, 388 S.E.2d at 54l.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 106, 388 S.E.2d at 54l.
238. That code section outlines the requirements for townhouse developments
and reads, in relevant part:
(a) A preliminary plat of a proposed townhouse development and a final
plat of the development shall be submitted pursuant to the provisions of
this chapter in conformity with subsection
(b) A site plan shall show the location of the buildings, streets, alleys,
walks, parking areas, recreation areas and facilities, numbered and
dimensional residential sites. When developments are required by this
Code to have common areas, such as cluster unit developments, .. . , the
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authority and that the refusal of the city to process the Marsh
site plan shall also show the common areas to be conveyed to a nonprofit
corporate homeowners' association. the members of which shall be all of
the owners of the residential sites within the development. . . . , the
following requirements shall be complied with:
(1) Residential sites. The site plan shall number and show the locations
and dimensions of residential sites within the development. A
residential site shall be that property intended for conveyance to a feesimple owner after the construction thereon of a single family residence , '
(2) Common areas. All areai3 which are shown on the site plan other
than public streets and residential sites, shall be shown and designated
as common areas, the fee-simple title to which shall be conveyed by the
developer to the homeowners' association. Such common areas shall not '
be subsequently subdivided or conveyed by the homeowners' association.
However, nothing herein shall prevent the mortgaging and
hypothecating of common properties, provided the rights of the
mortgagee are subordinated to the rights of the homeowners and
association. Furthermore nothing herein shall prevent the exchanging
of common properties for other properties when:
-written notice of the exchange is given to each member of the
association except in cases where the exchange is done to eliminate an
encroachment; and
-after the notice is given, if required, the homeowners association
approves the exchange; and
-the exchanged properties and other considerations are of like value
and utility; and
-the acreage anc!, configuration of the remaining open space equals
(including property to be received by the association in such exchange) .
or exceeds the requirements of this Code; and
-the exchange is approved by the planning director.
Common areas used exclusively for open space area in excess of the
required minimum may be located on separate lots owned by the
homeowners' association provided the common area is approved by the
city at the same time as the adjoining townhouse development and at
least fifty (50) per cent of the separated lot adjoins or is directly opposite
the townhouse development.
'
(3) Covenants and restrictions. The developer shall file with the
application for preliminary approval, a declaration of covenants and
restrictions governing the common areas, if any are required by this
Code, the homeowners' association, and residential sites . The
restrictions shall contain (but not be limited to) provisions for the,
following:
'
e. Easements over the common areas, if any, for access, ingress, and
egress from and to public streets and walkways and easements for
enjoyment of the common areas, as well as for parking, shall be granted
to each owner of a residential site.
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Creek Townes application denied the plaintiff all use of its property, and "thus . .. constituted a taking."239
At trial, the court held that the application of the subdivision
ordinance (section 10-3073) to the plaintiffs property did not
"work" a taking. 240 The plaintiff appealed, and before the court of
appeals could hear the case the supreme court assumed jurisdiction on its own initiative, ex mero motu. 241
On appeal the plaintiffs raised two related constitutional
issues. The first assertion was that the · city's refusal to process
the Marsh Creek Townes application was a "violation of due process under Article 1, § 19 of the N.C. Constitution ... and of the
fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution."242 In a unanimous opinion writt~n by Justice Meyer, the supreme court held:
[W]here a developer submits a project plan for approval and
undertakes the development of the property according to the
approved preliminary plan, a city may refuse to consider a subsequent stage of the overall project that fails to take into account the
prior development as proposed and undertaken in the prior stages
of development. 243
The plaintiff argued that the city was exercising its "police
power to further the narrow private interests of the Homeowners
Association members,"244 and that the city was required to
approve the subdivision because all of the requirements of the city
code were met. 245
The court agreed that the' city's police power must be used for
public instead of private purposes, but found no abuse of that
power. 246 The court held that the developer had not met the city's
requirements, stating "the project [Marsh Creek Townes] fails the
RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part 10, Planning & Development § 103073 (1982 & Supp. 1991).
239. River Birch, 326 N.C. at 106, 388 S.E.2d at 54l.
240. [d. at 107, 388 S.E.2d at 542.
241. [d. at 103, 388 S.E.2d at 539. The supreme court acted pursuant to N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-31(a) and N.C. R. A;pP. P. 15(e)(2). Note that this case has the
same procedural posture as Finch, see supra notes 117-121 and accompanying
text.
242. [d. at 115, 388 S.E.2d at 546-547. See N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 19. Supra
note 85 and accompanying text. The U.S. CONST. amend. XIV is discussed supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
243. [d.
244. [d.
245. [d. at 116, 388 S.E.2d at 547.
246. [d.
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approval process because it differs significantly from the prior pveliminary plan as approved and undertaken by the developer."247
Also, the court held that the city can use its authority to ensure
compliance with its established standards. 248 The court stated
that "one such standard is that a final approved plat shall comply
substantially with the prior [preliminary] approved plat."249
Thus, the developer is bound by the preliminary plat it submitted
and built. The court went on to say, "Section 10-3013 (b)250
requires preliminary plats to show ... the [b]oundary line of the
proposed development, the lot lines, parcels ofland to be dedicated
to public use .... Thus, the City's refusal to process the ... pr(i)p(!)sal is not an abuse of police power; rather, this refusal is the result
of enforcement of established standards."251
The court also found that the developer was estopped from
attacking the validity of the subdivision ordinance because he
received significant benefits under that ordinance, such as the
ability to increase density "to greater than otherwise allowed
under the zoning ordinance. Raleigh explicitly ties this right to
subdivision approval."252 The court held that, "having substantially undertaken the development according to the approved preliminary plan, [developer] indicated its assent to the conditio»
that development be according to the approved preliminary pIa»
"reserving three acres as common open space."253 In conclusion,
the court found that the developer could not "attack a condition of
its own making which the City ... accepted."254
The plaintiffs second assignment of error was that the city
ordinances requirement that the parcel in dispute be transferred
247. [d.
248. [d.
249. [d.
250. RALEIGH, N.C ., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part 10, Planning & Development,
§ 10-3013(b) (1982 & Supp. 1991).
251. River Birch, 326 N.C. at 117, 388 S.E.2d at 548.
252. [d. at 119, 388 S.E.2d at 549. The ordinance provision reads, in relevant
part:
[T]he developers of residential projects land under unified control. . .
may reduce the size of individual lots and provide different housing
styles such as townhouses ... as permitted by these regulations and the
zoning ordinance by receiving subdivision approval in accordance with
this chapter.
RALEIGH, N.C., CODE OF ORDINANCES, Part 10, Planning & Development § 103071(b) (1982 & Supp. 1991).
253. River Birch, 326 N.C. at 119, 388 S.E.2d at 549.
254. [d.
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to the homeowners association constituted a "taking of land."255
The court used a two part test to determine if a taking had
occurred. The first prong of the test was the ends-means test, asking if there 'is a rational relationship between the ends sought and
the means taken. 256 The second prong was the determination of
"whether the property has a practical use and a reasonable value,"
after the regulation is applied. 257
As to the first part of the test, the court found, "The objective
of preserving open space is within the scope of a municipality's
police power."258 The Raleigh subdivision ordinance "is part of a
comprehensive plan of development that applies uniformly to all
property owners and from which all property owners, including
developers, will benefit."259 The court concluded that Raleigh's
ordinance was a reasonable means to provide for open space as
authorized by section 160A-402 260 of the General Statutes because
the ordinance ensures that open space will exist and be main255 . Id. at 120, 388 S.E.2d at 549.
256. Id. at 121, 388 S.E.2d at 550. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying
text. See also NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); infra
notes 336-338 and accompanying text (applying the "rational nexus" test).
257. River Birch, 326 N.C. at 121, 388 S.E.2d at 550 (quoting Finch, 325 N.C.
352, 364, 384 S.E.2d 8, 15 (1989».
258. Id. (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980».
259. Id. The court appears to be invoking the average reciprocity of advantage
test discussed supra at notes 51-53 alld accompanying text.
260. This section of the General Stat)ltes gives municipalities broad powers to
take action to preserve open space. It reads:
The General Assembly finds that the rapid growth and spread of urban
development . in the State is encroaching upon, or eliminating, many
open areas and spaces of varied size and character, including many
having significant scenic or esthetic values, which areas and spaces if
preserved and maintained in their present open state would constitute
important physical, social, esthetic, or economic assets to existing and
impending urban development. The General Assembly declares that it is
necessary for sound and proper urban development and in the public
interest of the people of this State for any county or city to expend or
advance public funds for, or to accept by purchase, gift, grant, bequest,
devise, lease, or otherwise, the fee or any lesser interest or right in real
property so as to acquire, maintain, improve, protect, limit the future
use of, or otherwise conserve open spaces and areas within their
respective jurisdictions as defined by this Article.
The General Assembly declares that the acquisition of interests or
rights in real property for the preservation of open spaces and areas
constitutes a public purpose for which public funds may be expended or
advanced.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-402 (1987).
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tained in the future. 261 In final answer to the question of whether
the subdivision ordinance met the ends-means test, the court held
that "a city ordinance providing for conveyance of open space to an
association of home owners living within the subdivision is reasonably related to the purpose of preserving open space."262
As to whether the subdivision ordinance denied the reas~)Ji
able value and practical use of the parcel, the plaintiff attempted
to define the estate taken as just the three acres of "common open
space," which, it argued, was entirely taken. 263 The court disagreed, finding that the appropriate estate was the entire 19.6
acres. 264 The court noted that the developer received substantial
benefits by obtaining preliminary approval for the whole 19.6
acres, including an increase in density which enabled the developer to make "substantial profits."265 The court reasoned,
"[ w]here the subdivider creates the specific need for the parks, it is
not unreasonable to charge the subdivider with the burden of providing them."266 As to the second prong of the test, the court concluded that the "denial of a project application which would
violate the valid condition of a previously approved and substantially undertaken proposal works no taking of the three-acre
area."267
This general philosophy of the North Carolina law of regulatory takings has been in rough accord with modern federal decisions. 268 A majority of the North -Carolina Supreme Court as led
261. River Birch, 326 N.C. at 121, 388 S.E.2d at 550. Note that the city is
exchanging a slight increase in residential density for open space at for no initial
outlay of public funds. Perpetual maintenance is assured, at least for as long as
the Homeowners Association exists. Whether the entire development provides a
net revenue gain to the city is another question, and one which is beyond the
scope of this inquiry.'
262. Id.
263. Id. This attempt to define a small estate for takings purposes has
precedent in takings law. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922) (support estate); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los
Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (temporal estate). But see Penn Central
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (all of plaintiff's property in
the vicinity of Grand Central Terminal considered to be one estate.)
264. River Birch, 326 N.C. at 121-22, 388 S.E.2d at 550-51.
265. Id .
266. Id. at 122, 388 S.E.2d at 551 (citing Billings Properties, Inc. v. .
Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 187-88 (Mont. 1964)).
267. Id .
268. See, e.g., Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104
(1978); Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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by Justice Meyer has upheld .a ll zoning ordinances and related
exactions promulgated under the General Statutes and/or through
validly adopted ordinances. The court has not so far overturned
the legislative judgement of a city councilor county commission.
Absent any clear signals from the United States Supreme Court,
this body of precedent should mean that the law is settled in
North Carolina. It is not. The United States Supreme Court has
begun to express displeasure with the Penn Central doctrine.
Starting with the trio of U.S. Supreme Court cases decided in
1987 discussed in the next section, the federal courts began to
overturn long established notions of takings . . Also, the General
Assembly has recently considered numerous bills to limit development related exactions and to find that property owners rights are
vested vis a vis zoning changes. The General Assembly has
adopted a few minor bills in the area of "vested rights" but has
done nothing to change the basics of the holdings discussed jn this
section. To date, the North Carolina courts have not changed
their position in response to the current federal holdings in this
area, which are discussed infra.
VI. THE 1987 U.S. SUPREME COURT TRILOGY OF
TAKING CLAUSE DECISIONS
In 1987, three important decisions issued by the United
States Supreme Court signaled the beginning of a shift in the way
in which the Court views reguiatory takings.269 The outlines and
ramifications of this shift are still unclear.27o Potentially, these
changes are the most profound · since the Supreme Court found
comprehensive zoning ordinances to be constitutional in the
1920s. 271
In Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis,272 the
Court reversed Justice Holmes' seminal decision on the law of reg269. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987);
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304
(1987); NoHan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
270. See, e.g. , Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Descent and Resurrection, 1987
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1987).
271. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (rejecting a regulatory
takings claim against a municipal zoning ordinance). See also Nectow v. City of
Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) (overturning a zoning ordinance for want of the
proper findings of fact, but the constitutionality of zoning ordinances was
upheld).
272. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
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ulatory takings espoused in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon. 273 .
Since Mahon laid the basis for the analytical framework of much ·,
of modern takings law, it deserves a brief explanation in order to
better understand the implications of Keystone.
The Pennsylvania statutes under attack as facially invalid on
regulatory takings grounds in both Mahon and Keystone were
very similar. The Kohler Act was at issue in Mahon. The Kohler
Act forbade the mining of anthracite coal in such a way as to cause
the subsidence of human habitation or within 150 feet of , anY'
habitation, except where the surface estate and the underground
coal were owned by the same person. 274
'
The Pennsylvania Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land
Conservation Act (PBMSA) was at issue in Keystone .275 The
PBMSA prohibited coal mining that caused subsidence damage to
pre-existing public buildings, dwellings and cemeteries. 276 Pursuant to its PBMSA authority, the Pennsylvania Department of
Environmental Resources (DER) promulgated implementing regulations requiring that 50% of the coal beneath protected structures be kept in place to provide surface support.277 Section "6 of
the PBMSA [authorized] the DER to revoke mining permit[s] if
the removal of coal [caused] damage to a structure or area protected by § 4 and the operator [did] not within six months ... [satisfy] a claim."278
273. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
274. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412-13.
275. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474.
276. 52 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1406.4 (Supp. 1993).
277. That section of the Pennsylvania Act reads:
In order to guard the health, safety and general welfare of the public, no
owner, operator, lessor, lessee, or general manager, superintendent or
other person in charge of or having supervision over any bituminous
coal mine shall mine bituminous coal so as to cause damage as a result
of the caving-in, collapse or subsidence of the following surface
structures in place on April 27, 1966, overlying or in the proximity of the
mine.
(1) Any public building or any noncommercial structure
customarily used by the public, including but not limited to
churches, schools, hospitals, and municipal utilities or municipal
public dwelling service operations,
(2) Any dwelling used for human habitation; and
(3) Any cemetery or public burial ground; unless the current owner
of the structure consents and the resulting damage is fully repaired
or compensated."
52 PA. CONS. STAT. Mm. § 1406.4.
278. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 447.
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Except for de minimis differences, the two statutes differ only
in their application. The later statute applied to all structures in
all the coal fields of western Pennsylvania; the Kohler Act was
limited primarily to towns around Scranton. 279 The Holmes Court
found that the Kohler Act worked as a taking and was unconstitutional; the Stevens court found just the opposite. 280
In order to ascertain whether there was a taking, Justice
Holmes devised the "diminution in value test:"281
Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law ... some values are enjoyed under an
implied limitation and must yield to the police power . . . the
implied limitation must have its limits or the contract and due
process clauses are gone. One fact for consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the diminution .. . . [T]he question
depends upon the particular facts. 282
Again, a few pages later, Holmes pithily opined that the standard
by definition was an ad hoc one: "[T]his is a question of degree
and therefore cannot be disposed of by general propositions."283
The North Carolina rule on takings mentioned supra seems to be
in general accord with the doctrine of diminution of value. 284
In Keystone Justice Stevens repeated modern Supreme Court
formulations of the test for regulatory takings - that it is a determination that the public must pay for the property taken, which
"necessarily requires a weighing of private and public interests."285 Justice Stevens also noted that, "although a comparison
of values before and after [a regulatory action] is relevant, ... it is
by no means conclusive."286 Justice Stevens also quoted Mahon
on determining the line between a regulatory taking and a rea279. See Epstein, supra note 270, at 13.
280. See infra notes 295-302 and accompanying text.
281. Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue is Still a
Muddle, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 561, 567-68 (1984).
282. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
283. Id. at 415. In his well-reasoned dissent Justice Brandeis said Justice
Holmes was really misapplying the "average reciprocity of advantage test."
Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 422. Some commentators have also analyzed
Holmes' underlying rationale as being this test. See Epstein, supra note 270.
284. See generally supra notes 102-268 (entire spectrum of North Carolina
decisions); see also supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text (Penn Central
holding).
285. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 479 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260-61 (1980».
286. Id. at 490 (quoting Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962».
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sonable exercise of government power and concluded that "the
question depends upon the particular facts ."287
If the decision on whether a regulatory taking has occurred is
an ad hoc on~, it should depend entirely on the weight a sitting
court gives to the factors it chooses to examine. In Mahon, in
terms of the public benefit, Holmes found that as a single private
house was affected there was a limited public interest. 288 No
question of personal safety was involved, as the statute provided
for notice before any mining could cause subsidence. 289 As to the
private costs inflicted by the statute, Holmes found that without
the right to mine, coal has no value. "To make it commercially
impracticable to mine ... coal has the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating ... it."290
Holmes believed that the state's taking of the support estate
was analogous to the government taking a street right-of-way
without paying for it.291 The public should only receive the rights
it pays for and neglect to purchase subsurface rights meant that
the surface owners should bear the loss.292 Holmes concluded that
the "act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the police power, so
far as it affects the mining of coal under streets or cities ... where
the right to mine ... coal has been reserved."293
In Keystone Justice Stevens examined a very similar statute
and set of facts, yet came to opposite conclusions on almost every
point. Procedurally, both cases involved a facial challenge of
unconstitutionality,294 yet Stevens found that the plaintiff lost no
profit and that no mines were closed as a result of the statute. In
analyzing the same factors as Holmes, Stevens held:
First, unlike the Kohler Act, the character of the governmental
action involved here leans heavily against finding a taking; . .. .
Pennsylvania has acted to arrest what it perceives to be a significant threat to the common welfare. Second, there is no record in
this case to support a finding, similar to the one the Court made in
287. Id. at 474.
288. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 -14.
289. Id. at 414.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 415. Pennsylvania recognizes three estates in real property: the
surface estate, the subsurface estate (or mineral rights) and the support estate.
Holmes found that the entire support estate was taken. If a support estate is not
recognized, the extent of the taking is markedly diminished.
292. Id . at 415.
293. Id. at 414:
294. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 495.
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Pennsylvania Coal, that the Subsidence Act makes it impossible
for petitioners to profitably engage in their business .. .. "[n]one of
the indicia of a statute enacted solely for the benefit of private parties identified in Justice Holmes opinion are presented here.
First, Justice Holmes explained that the Kohler Act was a private
benefit statute since it ordinarily does not apply to land when the
surface is owned by the owner of the coal." The Subsidence Act, by
contrast, has no such exception. The current surface owner may
only waive the protection of the Act if the DER consents.295

As to the diminution in value, the Keystone court held that there
was "no showing of diminution in value sufficient ... to satisfy the
heavy burden placed upon one alleging a regulatory taking." Contrast Holmes' finding in Pennsylvania Coal: "[The] Kohler Act
made mining of certain coal commercially impracticable .... "296
In the face of such a clear opinion and based on such similar
facts and statutes, how could Stevens have reached such a contradictory result? One commentator sugg.e sted that Stevens
assumed away Holmes' opInIon as mere dicta. 297
"[U]ncharacteristically, Justice Holmes provided the parties with
an advisory opinion discussing 'the general validity of the Act.' "298
Once free of the constraints of stare decisis, Justice Stevens considered the three real property estates (surface, support and mineral or sub-surface) to be one estate. By revising the definition of
the property taken, Stevens could find that only some of the entire
estate had been lost, instead..of all of the support estate as Holmes
held. 299 Possibly the most telling reason was that Stevens
believed that times had changed and that the law needed to keep
up with current land use controls. "The Subsidence Act is a prime
example that circumstances may so change in time ... as to clothe

......

295. Id. at 485-486 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414) (citation
omitted).
296. Id. at 493 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 393).
297. Epstein, supra note 270, at 15.
298. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 483. The question as to whether Holmes' opinion
was advisory is still controversial. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
intervened as an amicus to argue the validity of the statute.
299. This approach to regulatory takings was in accord with modern doctrine.
A "clear" definition of the evolved rule is found in Penn Central. "In deciding
whether a particular governmental action has effected a taking, this Court
focuses ... both on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole- here, the city tax block
designated as the 'landmark site.''' Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-131 (1978).

Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1994

47

Campbell Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 5

380

CAMPBELL

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 16:333

with a [public] interest what at other times . . . would be a matter
of purely private concern."300
The second and third cases 301 in the 1987 trilogy at least in
part reversed the Supreme Courts trend of holding that there is no
regulatory taking unless property is physically invaded.302 First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County
(First English) was the first modern case in which the Supreme
Court held that a regulatory taking through a zoning ordinance
requires compensation. 303
In 1957 the plaintiff in First English built a camp for the
handicapped called Lutherglen. 304 Lutherglen was located beside
a stream in a mountain canyon outside Los Angeles. In 1978 a
flood destroyed the camp.305 The county adopted an "interim ordinance prohibiting the construction or reconstruction of any building or structure in an interim flood protection area that included
... Lutherglen" in January, 1979. 306 The California Supreme
Court refused to hear an appeal on October 17, 1985, six years arid
ten months from the date of adoption of the "interim
ordinance."307
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Supreme Court
on a claim of regulatory taking, seeking a remedy of monetary
damages. The county argued that if a taking was found, the correct relief would be to invalidate the ordinance, but order no damages, "until the ordinance was finally declared unconstitutional, '
and then only for any period after that declaration for which the
county seeks to enforce [the interim ordinance]."308
300. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488 (quoting Black v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155
(1971)).
301. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482
U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
302. See Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982);
Penn Central Transp. Co ., 438 U.S. 104.
303. First English, 482 U.S. at 304. See also Epstein, supra note 270.
304. First English, 482 U.S. at 304.
305. Id.
306. Id. In relevant part, the ordinance provided: "[a] person shall not
construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or structure, any portion of
which is, or will be, located within the outer boundary lines of the interim flood
protection area located in Mill Creek Canyon." The ordinance was effective
immediately because the County found that it was "required for the immediate '
preservation of the public health and safety . . .. " Los ANGELES COUNTY, CAL.,
INTERIM ORDINANCE 11,855 (Jan. 1979).
307. First English, 482 U.S. at 319.
308. Id. at 312.
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Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist309 held that
"where the government's activities have already worked a taking
of all use of the property, no subsequent action by the government
can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period
during which the taking was effective."310 The analysis used to
determine that there was a taking was the same used to find the
government liable for temporary takings where the government
moved into actual physical possession of leased property for a
term ofyears. 311 Once a taking was found, any temporary characterization was irrelevant to the majority. "'[T]emporary' takings
which ... deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the Constitution
clearly requires compensation."312
The majority rejected the defendant's argument that the
proper remedy was to find the ordinance invalid, stating:
"[I]nvalidation of the ordinance . . . after this period of time,
though converting the taking into a temporary one, is not a sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compensation
Clause."313 The majority reversed the judgment of the lower court
and remanded the case to see if a taking had occurred, and if so,
what the proper computation of damages might be. 314
309. Id. at 305. (Joining Chief Justice Rehnquist were Justices Brennan,
Marshall, Powell, White and Scalia. Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, in which
Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined.)
310. Id. at 321.
-.
311. Id. at 318. In First English, the court cited United States v. Dow, 357
U.S. 17,26 (1958), which in turn cited a string of World War II era cases for the
proposition that the government must compensate even a temporary
appropriation of private property.
312. First English, 482 U.S. at 318.
313. Id. at 319.
314. ld. at 322. The measure of damages for temporary takings is apparently
well established. "Where property is taken as the result of government action for
a temporary period of time, rather than permanently, the measure of
compensation is not the fair market value of the property, but what the property
is fairly worth during the time for which it is held or encumbered: in other words,
the fair rental value of the property for the period it was held, or encumbered."
Finch, 325 N.C. at 376, 384 S.E.2d at 21 (citing 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain
§ 351 (1966); 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 142 (1965); see Annotation, Elements
and Measure of Compensation in Eminent Domain for Temporary Use and
Occupancy, 7 AL.R. 2d 1297 (1949)). Justice Brennan articulated a similar rule
in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting):
'rhe constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a court finds that a
police power regulation has effected a 'taking, the government entity
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Speaking for the dissenters, Justice Stevens distinguished a
temporary physical taking, which may require compensation,
from a regulatory taking for which no taking will be found ·unless
a major portion of the property is destroyed. 315 Delay in approving development plans or issuing building permits were viewed as
mere "incidents of ownership."316 Any "temporary diminution in
the value of property" should not automatically activate the compensation requirement of the Takings Clause, "absent extraordinary delay."317
The key issue is whether the majority correctly applied the
doctrine of temporary physical takings to temporary regulatory
takings. Stevens' principal point was that the former could not be
stretched to encompass the latter.318 In dissent, Stevens wrote:
The diminution of value inquiry is unique to regulatory takings.
Unlike physical invasions, which are relatively rare and easily
identifiable without making any economic analysis, regulatory
programs constantly affect property values in countless ways, and
only the most extreme regulations can constitute takings. 319

Under what circumstances, if any, the dissent would find a regulatory taking is unclear. The defense's theory, that there should
never be compensation for a temporary regulatory taking was
overturned by a majority of six Justices. This may open the door
for more findings of a regulatory taking in the future
The final 1987 case, Nollan u. California Coastal Commission,320 involved the state go;v.ernment's requirement that issuing
a permit to replace an old beach house with a newer dwelling
depended on granting the public access to the beach. 321 The
Supreme Court found that such an exaction would not be a taking
only if there was a "rational nexus'; between the subject of the permit and the state's easement. 322
must pay just compensation for the period commencing on the date the
regulation first effected the 'taking, and ending on the date the
government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the
regulation.

Id.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

First English, 482 U.S. at 329.
Id. at 333-34.
Id. at 332-33.
Epstein, supra note 283.
First English, 482 U.S. at 329.
483 U.S. 825 (1987).
Id at 827-828.
Id. at 837.
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The plaintiff leased property with an option to buy. A 504square-foot beach house was on the property. In order to replace
the dwelling with a two-story, three-bedroom, 1,674-square-foot
residence with a 817-square-foot garage plaintiff was required to
obtain a coastal development permit from the California Coastal
Commission. 323 The commission granted the permit on condition
that the plaintiffs give a "lateral easement" across the beach side
of the lot between the mean high tide line and the plaintiffs seawall. 324 The easement extended across forty-three other ocean
front lots (out of a total of sixty) in the subdivision. The ultimate
purpose ofthe easement was to link two separate units of the California state parks system. 325 Historically, the public had been
allowed to travel along the beach by both the original owners (who
first leased the lot to the plaintim and later the plaintiff. 326
The plaintiff refused to accept the condition of the permit and
ultimately built a new dwelling without the permit.327 The plaintiff also "filed a ... petition for a writ of ... mandamus with the
superior court, in which he argued that imposition of the access
condition violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as
incorporated against the States by the . Fourteenth Amendment."328 The court found for the plaintiff on statutory grounds,
thus not reaching the constitutional question. 329 The court of
appeals reversed. 330 The Nollans then appealed to the U.S.
Supreme Court, raising only the constitutional question.331
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia found that a taking
had occurred, based on the plaintiffs loss of the property right of
exclusion. 332 The majority explained this holding in the following
terms: "As to property reserved by its owner for private use, the
right to exclude [others is] one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."333
323. [d.
324. [d. at 828.
325. [d.
326. [d. at 858.
327. [d. at 828-30.
328. [d. at 829.
329. [d.
330. [d. at 830.
331. [d. at 831.
332. [d.
333. [d. (quoting Loretto v. TelePrompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176,
(1979» .
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In other words, the majority found that the right of individuals to
pass over the plaintiffs' property equaled a permanent physical
occupation. 334 Where a government action results in a permanent
physical occupation, the Supreme Court has "uniformly found a
taking . . . without regard to whether the action achieves an
important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on
the owner."335
Having decided that requiring the uncompensated conveyance of an easement would violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
Justice Scalia then examined the question of whether requiring
the conveyance as a condition of receiving a permit removes the
regulation from the ambit of a taking. 336 The majority articulated
the test in this case as follows: "[The] land use regulation does not
effect a taking if it substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests and does not den[y] an owner economically viable use of his
land."337 The Court applied the test and held that
the lack of nexus between the condition [lateral easement] and the
original purpose of the building restriction [to protect the public's
ability to see the beach, to help the public to overcome a psychological barrier to using the beach and preventing congestion of the
beach] converts that purpose ... [to] the obtaining of an easement
... without payment of compensation. 338

The dissent disagreed with almost every point in the majority's analysis. In the primary dissent,339 Justice Brennan wrote
that the majority was "simply wrong that there is no reasonable
relationship between the permit condition and the specific type of
334. Id. at 832.
335. Id. at 831-32 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 434-35).
336. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987). Justice
Scalia's exact words were: "Given then, that requiring uncompensated
conveyance of the easement outright would violate the Fourteenth Amendment,
the question becomes whether requiring it to be conveyed as a condition for
issuing a land-use permit alters the outcome." Id. Epstein, supra note 203 at 35,
believes that Justice Scalia invented what he terms a "theory of unconstitutional
conditions."
337. Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980».
338. Id. at 837.
339. See id. at 826 (outlining the Court's vote). Justice Brennan wrote the
longest and most closely reasoned dissent. Justice Marshall joined in Justice
Brennan's dissent. Justice Blackmun filed a brief dissent. Justice Stevens also
filed a dissent, in which he was joined by Justice Blackmun. Stevens' primary
point in his dissent was that Justice Brennan's dissent was much improved over
his dissent in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981).
The San Diego dissent is discussed supra at note 314.
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burden on public access created by the appellant's proposed development . . . . [T]his record reveals rational public action by any
conceivable standard."340 First, Justice Brennan believed that the
public's view of the beach is related to the size of the building, and
that it is a rational public purpose to provide access across the
beach so that people on the road may see the public on the
beach.341 Second, this dissent believed that the majority was in
error in assuming that the "fit between the burden and the exaction" only comprised visual access. 342 Brennan held that the Nollans' new house also blocked physical access along the beach as
the mean high tide line fluctuated seasonally.343
Also, Justice Brennan argued that the majority's takings
analysis was incorrect, saying that the California exaction did not
interfere with the plaintiffs investment-backed expectations. 344
"[P]hysical access to private property in itself creates no takings
problem if it does not unreasonably impair the value or use of
[the] property."345 According to Justice Brennan, the plaintiffs
made "no tenable claim" that their enjoyment or use of the property was diminished. 346
Moreover, the dissent contended that the California regulation was a conditional, as opposed to a unilateral, government
action. Government was not interfering with existing property
rights, but rather responding to the plaintiff's request to intensify
coastal development. 347 As such, the dissent argued, the average
"reciprocity of advantage" !est applied - the plaintiff got a bigger,
more valuable house, while the government affirmed public beach
access; access which the plaintiffs could also use. 348
Justice Brennan next maintained/that the plaintiffs' "claim of
economic injury is flawed because it rests on the assumption of
entitlement to the full ' value of their new development."349 The
plaintiffs should have had no expectation to be able to exclude the
public as the California Constitution "states that no one possess340. [d . at 314.
341. Nollan v. California Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 849 (1987).
342. [d. at 850.
343. [d . at 850-51.
344. [d. at 853.
345. [d. at 855 (quoting Prune Yard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,83
(1980)).
346. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 855 (1987).
347. [d. at 855.
348. [d. at 856 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (1922».
349. [d. at 857.
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ing the frontage of any navigable water in this State, shall be petmitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it is
required for any public purpose."350 Also, owners and lesseeS ' of
the property had allowed the public to cross the property since the
turn of the century.351 The plaintiffs were on "notice when
requesting a new development permit that a condition of approval
would be a provision ensuring [the] public lateral access to the
shore."352 Thus the plaintiffs had no investment-backed expectations and the permit condition did not take their property without
compensation. 353 In the .opinion of the dissent the defense had
proven that the right to exclude was not one of the plaintiffs' property rights. 354
The overall effect of these three cases is still controversial.
They may be no more than an aberration in the tangled skein, of
takings law. On the other hand, they may signal a new trend
toward a new approach to assessing regulatory takings. The new
precedent that ,these cases establish should be carefully consid~
ered by students of this area of the law.
The holdings of the individual cases offer little guidance . . The
Supreme Court typically establishes the test of a taking~ but then
remands the case to a lower court to determine if, under the
unique facts of the case, a taking has occurred. First English .did
find a regul/ltory taking with no physical invasion of property for
the first time since 1922.355 Also, for the first time, damages were
deemed appropriate fox. a temporary regulatory taking. Some
commentators believe that Nollan created an entirely new test for
regulatory takings. One view is that Justice Scalia "abandoned
the rational basis test of prior land use cases from Euclid to Agins
in favor of a standard demanding intermediate scrutiny of government restrictions."356 Others, including the North Carolina
Supreme Court, appear to view the rational nexus test of Nollan
as merely another formulation of the existing tests. The only certainty is that the courts will continue to wrestle with this question. New opinions may do little to clarify the ultimate direction
350. Id. (quoting CALIFORNIA CaNST. art. X, § 4 (Justice Scalia chose not to
address the state constitutional question, pointing out that it had been raised
neither by the coastal commission nor the state in the lower courts.)).
351. Id. at 858.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 859-60.
354. Id.
355. See Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
356. Epstein, supra note 270 at 38.
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of the Supreme Court. For example, the next section discusses a
new holding that can be interpreted as a profound change in takings jurisprudence.

VII. LUCAS V. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
The United States Supreme Court next ventured into this
area of the law with the long awaited decision in Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council. 357 Before turning to the federal decision a brieflook at the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision is
useful both as a forecast (in which the opposite decision was
reached) to the arguments of the federal justices and as a cautionary example of what not to do in the new environment for the
analysis of regulatory takings that the Rehnquist court is
unveiling one case at a time.
A single recitation of the facts will suffice, as the two courts
view of the facts was not markedly different. In 1986 the plaintiff,
David H. Lucas, purchased two ocean front lots in the Beachwood
East Subdivision .of the Wild Dunes development, Isle of Palms,
Charleston County, South Carolina for $975,000. 358 The lots were
separated by an existing single family dwelling; other single family dwellings existed along the stretch of beach where Lucas property was located. Evidence at trial tended to show that the lots
were underwater at extremely high tides and during storms. The
whole area had been inundated as recently as 1973. 359 At the
time of the trial the w;idthof the beach was 300 feet.360
In 1988, the S.C. General Assembly passed the Beachfront
Management Act (Act),361 limiting construction in the beach and
dune "critical area" seaward of a "set-back line".362 In the area in
controversy, the base-line was established by an analysis of historical shoreline locations. The required setback for residences is
forty times the annual erosion rate. 363 Plaintiffs properties were
east or seaward of the baseline. 364 The plaintiff was prohibited by
357. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
358. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C. 1991).
359. Environment and Development, Am. Plan. A. (Sept., 1992).
360. David Owens et al., Supreme Court Establishes Rule on "Total Taking":
Perspectives on the Lucas Case, Plan. and Zoning Bull., Inst. of Gov't, U. of N.
Carolina (Sept. 1992) at 2.
361. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 896. See Beachfront Management Act S.C. CODE
ANN. § 48-39-10, et seq. (Law. Co-op 1990).
362. [d.
363. Owens, supra note 374 at 1.
364. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (S.C. 1991).
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the Act from constructing any permanent structures save a walkway and small deck on his lots. 365 .The trial court found a taking,
awarding Lucas $1,232, 387.50 as ''just compensation for the regu_
latory taking."366 The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed
this ruling, in a three-to-two decision. 367
At the South Carolina Supreme Court Lucas conceded that
the Act is properly and validly designed to preserve the beaches
and that the preservation of the public resource is a "laudable
goal."368 As such the court declared that it was "in no position to
365. [d.
366. [d.
367. [d.
368. [d . The Court quoted ALL of the Acts findings and policy sections:
SECTION 1. The General Assembly finds that:
(1) The beach/dune system along the coast of South Carolina is
extremely important to the people of this State and serves the following
functions:
(a) protects life and property by serving as a stonn barrier which
dissipates wave energy and contributes to shoreline stability in an
economical and effective manner;
(b) provides the basis for a tourism industry that generates
approximately two-thirds of South Carolina's annual tourism industry
revenue which constitutes a significant portion of the state's economy.
The tourists who come to the South Carolina coast to enjoy the ocean
and dry sand beach contribute significantly to state and local tax
revenues;
-.
(c) provides habitat for numerous species of plants and animals,
several of which are threatened or endangered. Waters adjacent to the
beach/dune system also provide habitat for many other marine species;
(d) provides a natural health environment for the citizens of South
Carolina to spend leisure time which serves their physical and mental
well-being.
(2) Beach/dune system vegetation is unique and extremely
important to the vitality and preservation of the system.
(3) Many miles of South Carolina's beaches have been identified as
critically eroding.
(4) Chapter 39, Title 48, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976,
Coastal Tidelands and Wetlands, does not provide adequate jurisdiction
to the South Carolina Coastal Council to enable it to effectively protect
the integrity of the beach/dune system. Consequently, without adequate
controls, development has been unwisely sited too close to the system.
This type of development has jeopardized the stability of the beach/dune
system, accelerated erosion, and endangered adjacent property. It is in
both the public and private interests to protect the system from this
unwise development.
.
(5) The use of annoring in the form of hard erosion control devices
such as seawalls, bulkheads, and rip-rap to protect erosion-threatened
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structures adjacent to the beach has not proven effective. These
armoring devices have given a . false sense of secl,lrity to beach front
property owners. In reality, these hard structures, in many instances,
have increased the vulnerability of beach front property to damage from
wind and waves while contributing to the deterioration and loss of the
dry sand beach which is so important to the tourism industry.
(6) Erosion is a natural process which beconies a significant
. problem for man only when structures are erected in close proximity to
the beach/dune system. It is in both the public and private interests to
afford the beach/dune system space to accrete and erode in its natural
cycle. This space can be provided only by discouraging new construction
in close proximity to the beach/dune system and encouraging those who
have erected structures too close to the system to retreat from it.
(7) Inlet and harbor management practices, including the
construction of jetties which have not been designed to accommodate the
long shore transport of sand, can deprive downdrift beach/dune systems
of their natural sand supply. Dredging practices which include disposal
of beach quality sand at sea also can deprive the beach/dune system of
much-needed sand.
(8) It is in the state's best interest to protect and to promote
increased public access to South Carolina's beaches · for out-of-state
tourists and South Carolina residents alike.
(9) Present funding for the protection, management, and
enhancement of the beach/dune system is inadequate.
(10) There is no coordinated state policy for post-storm emergency
management of the beach/dune system.
(11) A long-range comprehensive beach management plan is
needed for the entire coast of South Carolina to protect and effectively
manage the beach/dl,lne system, thus preventing unwise development
and minimizing man's adverse impact on the system. (Emphasis
added).
. .
Section 2 of the Act reads:
SECTION 2. In recognition of its stewardship responsibilities, the
policy of South Carolina is to:
(1) protect, preserve, restore, and enhance the beach/dune system,
the highest and best uses of which are declared to provide:
(a) a barrier and buffer from high tides, storm surge, hurricanes,
and normal erosion;
(b) a public area which serves as a major source of state and local
revenue;
(c) habitat for indigenous flora and fauna;
(d) a place which harbors natural beauty;
(2) create a comprehensive, long-range beach management plan
and require . local comprehensive beach management plans for the
protection, preservation, restoration, and enhancement of the beach/
dune system. These plans must promote wise use of the state's beach
front to inClude a gradual retreat from the system over a forty-year
period;
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question the legislative scheme or purpose" of the Act. 369 By failing to attack the legislative findings, the court deemed that Lucas
had conceded his case.
'
The court stated that it too was bound by the legislative findings. Lucas sole theory of recovery was that a "regulatory taking"
occurred because he was depriv~d of "all economically viable :use"
of his property and was thus due compensation. 370 The court
noted that the United States Supreme Court had not settled on a
rule of takings, but instead analyzed "factors" to determine if 'a
regulatory taking existed. The court used the factors from 'Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis in its analysis. 371 "[T]he [United Statesl Supreme Court has time and again
held that when a state merely regulates use, and acts to prevent a
serious public harm, there is no 'taking' for which compensation is
due."372 As he did not challenge the government's motives, the
court held that Lucas conceded that this "nuisance-like exception"
applied. 373
The South Carolina Supreme Court majority noted that
Lucas' argument was tailored to Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
(3) severely restrict the use of hard erosion control devices to armor
the beach/dune system and to encourage the replacement of hard
erosion control devices with soft technologies as approved by the Coastal
Council which will provide for the protection of the shoreline without
long-term adverse effects; _,
(4) encourage the use of erosion-inhibiting techniques which do not
adversely impact the long-term well-being of the beach/dune system;
(5) promote carefully planned nourishment as a means of beach
preservation and restoration where economically felisible;
(6) preserve existing public access and promote the enhancement of '
public access to assure full enjoyment of the beach by all our citizens including the handicapped;
(7) involve local governments in long-range comprehensive
planning and management of the beach/dune system in which they have
a vested interest;
(8) establish procedures and guidelines for the emergency
management of the beach/dune system following a significant storm
event.
Id.
369. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 896.
370. Id. at 898.
371. Id. at 899. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987).
372. Id. at '900.
373. Id. at 900.
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Keystone. 374 Justice Toal interpreted Rehnquist's dissent as holding "that in no case has t4e Court accepted the proposition that
the State may completely extinguish a property interest or prohibit all .u se without providing compensation."375 Justice Toal
noted that "Lucas' argument tracks the position of Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone. "376 The South Carolina majority cited
local case law to uphold their reaffirmation of the takings test
from Keystone. 377 The majority did not recognize the adverse
United States Supreme Court authority of First English and
Nollan. 378
The minority opinion from South Carolina·is a forecast of the
federal majority's argument. The dissent noted that by the logic of
Keystone, "[n]o matter how valueless a person's property [became
after a regulatory taking], if the taking was pursuant to a valid
exercise of the police power it could never be compensated. [T]his
could become an exception which would swallow the rule."379
Next, the minority interpreted the rule of Keystone to require
the court to review the public purpose of a challenged regulation
first. Then, the regulation may be found unconstitutional because
the public purpose for which it was enacted may be deemed illegitimate or insufficient. Alternatively, the regulation may prevent a
nuisance and, as such, require no compensation. 380 In the third
recognized alternative, the court finds that no nuisance is abated;
a legitimate state interest is advan,ced, but compensation is
required because it can be sho)yn that all economically viable use
of the regulated property has been lost. 381
The minority found that the Beachfront Management Act
advanced a valid state interest, but in doing so it deprived Lucas
of all economic use of his property. The test is "a comparison of
the value that has been taken ... with the value that remains in
the property."382 Under this test, the "Act's prohibition against
the erection of any habitable structure caused the value of the lots
374. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 901 (S.C. 1991).
375. Id.
376. Id. at 901 (citing Keystone, 480 U.S. at 503 (Rehnquist J., dissenting».
377. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 901 (citing Carter v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
314 S.E.2d 327 (1984).
378. See supra notes 301-338 and accompanying text.
379. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 905 (S.C. 1991)
(citing Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting».
380. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 906.
381 . Id.
382. Id. at 907 (citing Keystone, 480 U.S. at 499 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting».
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to plummet to zero. . . . Accordingly . . . a taking has been
established. "383
Six members of the United States Supreme Court384 found
that there had been a taking. 385 The Court upheld the Nollan and
Keystone tests for a taking. "[W]here regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land" a taking will be
found. 386 However, the Court did little to clarify this test, or to
describe the measurement of the estate allegedly taken or the
amount of the taking. 387 The Court then balanced the "average
383. Id. at 907. The dissent would not have awarded any monetary damages
until Lucas had been denied a special permit to build on his lots. In 1988
(between the briefing and the oral arguments) the legislature amended the act to
provide a variance procedure to allow some structures seaward of the baseline.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-290 (A) (6) and 48-39-290(D)(1) (Supp. 1990).
384. The majority was comprised of Justices Scalia, White, O'Connor, Thomas
and the Chief Justice. Justice Kennedy concurred separately. In a separate
statement Justice Souter opined that certiorari had been improvidently granted.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens dis~ented.
385. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2888.
386. Id. at 2893 (citing Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 470, 495
(1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485,
(1987» (Other citations omitted).
387. In his now famous dicta in footnote 7, Scalia described what may become
the law on quantifying the estate taken:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our "deprivation of all economically
feasible use" rule is greater than its' precision, since the rule does not
make clear the "property interest" against which the loss of value is to
be measured. When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to
leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear whether we
would analyze the situation as one in which the owner has been
deprived of all economically beneficial use of the burdened portion of the
tract, or as one in which the owner has suffered a mere diminution in
value of the tract as a whole. (For an extreme-and, we think,
unsupportable-view of the relevant calculus, see Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York where the state court examined
the diminution in a particular parcel's value produced by a municipal
ordinance in light of total value of the taking claimant's other holdings
in the vicinity.) Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty regarding the
composition of the denominator in our "deprivation" fraction has
produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court. Compare
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon (law restricting subsurface extraction
of coal held to effect a taking), with Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v.
DeBenedictis (nearly identical law held not to effect a taking). The
answer to this difficult question may lie in how the owners reasonable
expectations have been shaped by the State's law of property-i.e.,
whether and to ' what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect
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reciprocity of advantage" test from Pennsylvania Coal 388 against
the requirement that "land ... be left ... in its natural state," and
found that the latter "carr[ies] with [it] a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some form of public service
under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."389 The Court
found the latter to be unacceptable.
Lucas' failure to challenge the purposes of the Beach Management Act brings the case within the line of Supreme Court cases
sustaining against due process and takings clause challenges the
state's use of its police powers to enjoin a property owner.390 The
Court admitted that many of its previous decisions suggested that
government can ban "harmful or noxious uses" of property.391
However, the majority held that the principle should be that the
"restrictions [are] reasonably related to the implementation of a
policy . . . expected to produce a widespread public benefit and
applicable to all similarly situated property."392
Speaking rhetorically, the Court asked who can say whether a
given regulation is "benefit conferring" or "harm preventing."393
The Court rejected the established benefit-harm analyses of taking issues,394 saying in essence that the legislatures of the various
states are unable to distinguish between a "benefit conferring"
and a "harm preventing" statute. 395 "Whether Lucas' construction
of single family residences on his parcels should be described as
to which the takings claimant alhJges a diminution in (or elimination of)
value. In any event, we avoid this difficulty in the present case, since
the "interest in land" that Lucas has pleaded (a fee simple interest) is an
estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law, and since the
South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that the Beachfront
Management Act lefty each of Lucass beachfront lots without economic
value.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n. 7 (citations omitted).
388. [d. (citing Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415).
389. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
390. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2896 (1992)
(citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (law prohibiting manufacture of
alcoholic beverages); Hadachek v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (law barring
operation of brick mill in residential area); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)
(order to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent infection of nearby orchards);
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962) (law effectively preventing
continued operation of quarry in residential area».
391. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
392. [d.
393. [d.
394. [d. at n. 10 . .
395. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2897 (1992).
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bringing 'harm' to South Carolina's adjacent ecological resources
thus depends principally upon whether the describer believes that
the State's use interest in nurturing those resources is so important that any competing adjacent use must yield."396 By the
Court's reasoning, a finding by a state legislature that a certain
private land use causes ." harm" should be given very little weight
in justifying a regulation. The Court may also have rejected the
established benefit-harm test for less severe takings, m&king .it
easier for governments to avoid paying compensation for partial
takings. 397
Justice Scalia articulated a new test to determine whether or
not a taking had occurred: "Where the state seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we
think it may resist compensation only if the logically anteced~nt
inquiry into the nature of the owners estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with."39~
Under this test the only regulations which take all economic use of
a property that do not require compensation are those which
"inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions ... the states law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."399 On
remand, the South Carolina courts were to determine damages if
they could not find any South Carolina property law extant jn
1986 (before plaintiff bought the lots) which could have affected
the plaintiffs right to build on the lots. 40o
The Court directs inquir¥ under the newly articulated test to
state nuisance law and particularly to the Second Restatement of
Torts in a "total taking inquiry."401 The "total taking" test
requires an analysis of five factors. The first is the degree of harm
to public lands and resources, or adjacent private property, posed
by the [land owner's] proposed activities. 402 The second factor is
"the social value of the land owner's activities and their suitability
396. Id. at 2898.
397. Daniel Mandelker, Land Use Law & Zoning Digest, Am. Plan. A. (Sept.,
1992).
398. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
399. Id. at 2900.
400. Id. at 2902.
401. Id. at 2901 (Justice Scalia lists the relevl:!.nt Restatement sections as 826,
827, 828, 830 and 831). As examples of a pre-existing property right that could
lead to a finding of no taking Scalia mentions an easement that could be enforced
at common law, or the common law navigational servitude the government holds
over submerged lands. Id.
402. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 826, 827 (1988).
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to the locality in question."403 The third factor is the relative ease
with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures
undertaken by the plaintiff and the government. 404 The fourth
factor is the length of time similarly situated property owners
have used their property. Long use by others is indicative of a
lack of any common law prohibition. 405 The final factor is whether
other similarly situated landowners were permitted to
continue. 406
Another important aspect of this case is that the court ignored
recently articulated ripeness holdings to hear this case before the
plaintiff had exhausted administrative appeals at the local and
state levels. 407 As the South Carolina Supreme Court gave its
opinion on the merits and not on ripeness grounds, the majority
decided that Lucas claim was ripe because he had been precluded
"both practically and legally" from construction on his lots during
the period that the Beachfront Management Act was in effect
before it was amended to allow construction inside the setback
line. 408 The dissent also maintained that Lucas' claim was not
justiciable, as he had suffered no injury in fact.409
Writing in dissent, Justice Blackmun stated that there was
no taking of "all economic uses" of property as the plaintiff still
had reasonable use of the property, for example, bird watching,
camping, picnicking and other similar activities. 410 The majority
opinion stated quite clearly that in this context reasonable use of
the property means reasonable economic use. 411 "The trial court
appeared to believe that the property could be considered 'valueless' if it was not available for its most profitable use."412 How403. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 828,
831 (1988).
404. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827(e), 828(c), 830 (1988).
405. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 827 cmt. g (1988).
406. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901.
407. Id. at 2892. (Justice Blackmun maintains that the majority ignored their
own rule, articulated a few days before in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S.
Ct. 2130 (1992). Justice Scalia distinguished Lujan on the grounds that it was
dismissed at summary judgment because the plaintiff did not address the facts in
sufficient depth and detail).
408. Id . at 2891. No evidence was presented that Lucas attempted to build
during the two years the Act prevented him from doing so. See supra note 382
for a discussion of the 1990 amendments to the Beachfront Management Act.
409. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2907 (Blackmun, J ., dissenting).
410. Id. at 2908.
411. Id. at' 2899-2900.
412. Id. at 2908.
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ever, Justice Blackmun reasoned, if the property is not valueless ,
the majority's decision was based on an error in fact.413
Justice Blackmun also took exception to the majority's finding
that the legislature's judgment as to the importance of the diminution of harm should be discounted. In the past courts have held
that "the existence of facts supporting legislative judgment is to 'be
presumed."414 The well established rule had been that plaintiffs
challenging the constitutionality of a statute must provide "some
factual foundation of record" that contravenes the legislature's
findings. 415 Rather than follow the traditional rule, in takings
cases the majority decided that the state has the burden of convincing the courts that the legislative findings are not in error.
This shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff as "the state now
has the burden of showing the regulation is not a taking."416
Justice Blackmun also found fault with the new scheme for
ascertaining whether a' complete regulatory taking had occurred.
The majority apparently abandoned the "case-specific inquiry into
the public interest advanced" so that, if a complete taking is
found, the public interest is not to be considered at all. 417 "When
the government regulation prevents the owner from any economically valuable use of his property, the private interest is unquestionably substantial, but we have never before held that no pu,blic
interest can outweigh it."418 In overturning the Mugler 419 line of
cases, according to Justice Blackmun, the majority announced an
incorrect new per se rule. -"No precise rule determines when property has been taken" but instead that "the question necessarily
requires a weighing of public and private interest;" therefore, rendering the public interest irrelevant if all value is taken. 420 In
profound disagreement over the meaning of prior case law, Justice
Blackmun said that the line of cases from Mugler through First
English was based on "whether the government interest was suffi413. [d. at 2909.
414. [d. (quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
(1938».
415 . [d. (quoting O'Gorman & Young v. Hart Fire Ins., 282 U.S. 252, 258
(1931».
416. [d.
417. [d. at 2910.
418. [d.
419. See supra note 390 and accompanying text.
420. Lucas 112 S. Ct. at 2911 n. 11. (Justice Blackmun theorized that Justice
Scalia found the new rule in Agins at 260-262.)
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,II
cient to prohibit the activity, given the significant private cost" not
"the availability of some residual valuable use."421
Also, Justice Blackmun pointed out what is still the crux of
the difficulty - how to define or segment the estate to determine
whether a taking has occurred. Blackmun noted that there is "no
'objective' way to determine what" the estate should be. 422 Is the
estate the entire property or is it just one of the property rights
from the "bundle of sticks"?423 Without being able to answer these
questions, basing a takings test on the common law of nuisance
clarifies little.
Ultimately even the Court cannot embrace the full implications of
its per se rule: it eventually agrees that there cannot be a categori.cal rule for a taking based on economic value that wholly disregards the public need asserted. Instead, the Court decides that it
will permit a State to regulate all economic value only if the State
prohibits uses that would not be permitted under background
principles of nuisance and property law. 424
Because common law nuisances are subject to interpretation, are
value-laden and are ultimately defined by the state courts, the
majority has not really developed a certain nor a "value free basis"
by which to judge takings. 425
Justice Stevens' dissent also noted that Lucas' claim was
neither ripe nor justiciable. He believed that the majority strained
to hear an unripe claim, overturning the long settled rule of judicial restraint. To him, c~,se precedent mandated that the court
exercise restraint and refuse to hear Lucas' case until his case was
ripe. · "The Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional
law in advance of the necessity of deciding it."426
In addition, Justice Stevens believed that a "categorical rule"
that complete regulatory takings must be compensated was in
error.427 He argued that the rule of Pennsylvania Coal - that the

I

421. [d. at 2911. At least for the time being, Blackmun's assessment of the
basis on which the prior cases was decided is incorrect. The North Carolina
courts seem to follow the majority rule and examine the residual estate, even
though they adopt decisions such as Penn Central which Justice Scalia eschews.
See supra notes 114-279 and accompanying text.
422. [d. at 2913.
423. [d.
424. [d. at 2912.
425. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2912-13.
426. [d. at 2918 (quoting Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288,
346-47 (1936».
427. [d.
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takings analysis is always a "question of degree and therefore cannot be disposed of by a general proposition" - should be followed. 428 Justice Stevens argued that the "categorical rule" is
arbitrary. For example, a land owner recovers nothing where a
regulation takes ninety-five per cent of the value of property, yet
the same owner recovers when the regulation takes just five , per
cent more. 429 Also, the definition of property rights is elastic; if
property is defined broadly, there is no taking. If property is
defined narrowly, a taking can always be found. 430
Justice Stevens went on to refute what he believed to be the
majority's three central arguments. First, if a "total deprivation of
feasible use is, from a land owner's point of view, the equivalent 'of
a physical appropriation[,]" then, also from a land owner's point
view, a diminution in value of fifty per cent is a taking of fifty per
cent.431 "Thus, the landowners perceptions of the regulation cannot justify the Court's new rule."432 Next, Justice Stevens argued,
as ~'total takings" are relatively rare, the new rule will not affect
the ability of government to "go on."433 Finally, Justice Stevens
argued that the majority's suggestion "that regulations that leave
the owner ... without economically beneficial . . . use ... carry
with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed
into some from of public service" does not justify a per se rule. 434
Justice Stevens reasoned that there is no correlation between a
"singling out" and a "total taking" as a regulation can single out a
property owner with out depriving her of anything, just as a regulation can deprive land owner of property rights without singling
one out.435 To Justice Stevens the important point is the specificity of the expropriating act.436
.
Justice Stevens also attacked the nuisance exception to the
categorical rule as unworkable. He asked if all governmental
prohibitions should be compensable. For example, should banning
the use of a harmful substance such as asbestos be com pens able?437 To Justice Stevens, adopting the nuisance exception froze

of

a

428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

[d. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416).
[d. at 2919.
[d.
[d. at 2920.
[d.
[d.
[d. at 2920.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2920 (1992).
[d.
[d. at 2921.
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the evolution of the common law, with potentially negative
effects. 438
Finally, Justice Stevens maintained that the South Carolina
Beachfront Management Act comported with the established rule
of takings. To Justice Stevens, the established rule is comprised
of three factors: "the character of the governmental action, its economic impact, and its interference with reasonable investmentbacked expectations."439 In Lucas, the Court ignored the first,
and, in Justice Stevens' opinion, the most important factor. The
purpose of the just compensation clause is to prevent the government from forcing individuals to bear public burdens. In order to
ascertain the distribution of burdens, the Court has looked to
whether all property owners are equally burdened ..:....- "the generality of [the] regulation[.]"440 Justice Stevens concluded that the
South Carolina effort was significantly general:
[T]he generality of the Beachfront Management Act is significant.
The Act does not target particular landowners, but rather regulates the use of the coastline of the entire state. Indeed, South
Carolina's Act is best understood as part of a national effort to
protect the coastline, one initiated by the Federal Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972. Pursuant to the Federai Act, every
coastal State has implemented coastline regulations. Moreover,
the Act did not single out owners of undeveloped land. The Act
also prohibited owners of developed land from rebuilding if their
structures were destroyed and what is equally significant, from
repairing erosion control devices. 441

Thus, Justice Stevens found that the Act was not unconstitutional
as it was sufficiently general in that it imposed "substantia~ burdens on owners of developed and undeveloped land alike."442 To
Justice Stevens this equitable distribution of financial burdens
shows that Lucas' investment backed expectations were not reasonable as other property owners faced equal, if not greater, financial burdens. 443 For example, renourishing a beach on an annual
basis, or allowing erosion control devices to deteriorate until
438. [d.
439. [d. at 2922 (quoting Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74,83
(1980».
440. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923 (1992).
441. [d. at 2924 (citations omitted).
442. [d.
443. [d.
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dwellings were swept out to sea, are financial burdens just as
extreme as those faced by Lucas. 444
The ultimate meaning of Lucas for land use specialists is far
from settled. It will doubtless bring another wave of decisions. It
is too soon to tell whether it means a major change in the law Qf
takings, or whether it is merely a narrow exception. The possiMe
ramifications of Lucas, and its affect on North Carolina law, ave
discussed in the next section.

VIII.

"101 .~ I

CONCLUSION

What then does all this mean for property owners, government officials and attorneys in North Carolina? Few, if any, con~
crete rules can be gleaned from the confusing and contradictory
case law of the diverse jurisdictions. If any trend is apparent, it is
that the North Carolina courts are reluctant to follow the fedem~
courts and that they will phrase the issues as much as possible to
establish and maintain local control over land use decisions.
The North Carolina ends-means test focuses on the relationship between the regulation and the reasonableness of the result.
At least by implication, the courts focus on the estate that is left
after the alleged regulatory taking. This conservative approach.
appears to be in accord with Lucas and its predecessors.
Typical North Carolina land-use regulations also appear to be
unaffected by Lucas because of the long-settled doctrine that a
regulatory taking occurs if all uses are eliminated. The North
Carolina Supreme Court held in 1962 in Helms that a regulation
that renders private property "valueless" or "has the effect of completely depriving an owner of the beneficial use of his property by
precluding all practical uses or the only use to which it is reasonably adapted" is a regulatory taking. 445
In addition, the Lucas court did not overrule previous holdings that some diminution in value is not in and of itself a taking.
However, this still skirts the basic question of the meaning of "valueless". Put another way, the North Carolina courts have not
articulated a rule stating how stringent a regulation must be
.
before it effects a taking.
If the North Carolina Supreme Court continues to decide taking claims on adequate and independent state grounds, as it did in
Batch, then the U.S. Supreme Court may not have the opportu444. [d.· at 2925.
445. Helms v. City of Charlotte, 255 N.C. 647, 653,122 S.E.2d 817,822 (1961).
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nity to rule on state taking law. Another option to avoid finding a
total taking is the state law: of inverse condemnation. If state
claims must be exhausted before the federal courts will entertain
federal constitutional claims, then a "total taking" should generate relief under the state .law of inverse condemnation before the
federal claims are reached.
North Carolina should remain relatively unaffected by the
United States Supreme Court's trend as illustrated in the line of
cases from Keystone to Lucas, as discussed above. However, if
these four cases are the beginning of a more pronounced trend
toward a more conservative view of private property rights, then
the law of North Carolina may be affected.
Viewed as a whole, the opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia in Keystone, First English, Nollan, Penn Central and Lucas have assembled at least the skeleton of a framework on which to base future regulatory taking holdings. The
factors raised by these cases were insignificant in the past. Now
they may be of great import. First English advanced the notion
that government must provide damages for "temporary takings."
This is a new (since 1987) remedy that gives land owners compensation for the period between enacting the regulation and the
court's determination that all value of a property has been taken.
Nollan requires that there be an apparent causal connection or
"rational nexus" between a regulation and the governmental purpose used to justify the regulation. What is "rational" or "apparent" is unclear and would seem to turn on both the facts of an
individual case and the ideological bent of individual judges. Nol lan, Keystone and others not discussed here raise interesting
questions about the segmentation of property rights. If the total
ownership rights in a piece of real property are analogous to a
"bundle of sticks," and if any "stick" is eliminated through a regulatory taking, has there been a taking? There are almost endless
ways to define and divide property rights. Depending on who
makes the definition, it can be either very easy or very difficult to
find a taking. In his dissent in Penn Central, Chief Justice Rehnquist chara.cterized New York's historic preservation ordinance as
singling out a few property owners (owners of historic land marks)
to bear the costs of historic preservation that the public should
accept. Rehnquist said that this type of regulation gives no "average reciprocity of advantage" to the property owner in that there
were no common benefits and burdens and thus is not analogous
to zoning or other constitutional land use regulations.
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Also, in his Penn Central as well as his Keystone dissents
Rehnquist laid the groundwork for the "nuisance exception" i~
Lucas. The prior decisions held that it was a valid exercise of the
police power to control public nuisances. In these cases Rehnquist
wrote that the nuisance exception should only apply to illegal uses
of property, or uses that are dangerous to others. The majority
found a nuisance exception; but Rehnquist would not since neither
coal mining (Keystone) nor railroading (Penn Central) is illegal. In
Lucas Scalia expanded on these earlier dissents to hold that the
state could not regulate the property unless a formal already adjudicated nuisance was found, or their was an existing common law
exception to existing property rights.
Additionally, Lucas shifts the burden of proof from the property owner to the government. In the past, the property owner
had to prove that the regulation was unreasonable, that it "took"
the property owner's land. Lucas shifts the burden to the government to prove that the property owner has "enough" property
rights left. At the very least, this facet of Lucas will make the
promulgation of environmental regulations much more difficult.
North Carolina follows the traditional rule as to the burden of
proof. This change alone would work profound changes in the
state's law.
Finally, the Lucas court showed a barely concealed disdain for
the findings of the South Carolina legislature. If the federal
courts ·are to discount legislative findings of fact and policy, then
the legislature's burden to establish a rational basis for regulation
has been greatly expanded. The United States Supreme Court
has decried judicial activism and interference in legislative
affairs. This facet of the Lucas opinion appears to raise the specter of just those perceived evils.
It is still too early too tell whether Lucas is a narrow exception, applicable only to the most extreme regulatory takings or
another bold stroke in rewriting the American law of regulatory
taking and a major expansion of private property rights. North
Carolina's case law seems to be little affected, for the time being.
However, it is not too soon for the local practitioner to take
the federal decisions into account. Future land use regulations
should be drafted conservatively; with care not to stray into one of
the "takings" outlined in this comment. At a minimum, all land
use regulations should include some variance procedure so that a
property 'owner subject to a "total taking" may be accorded some
relief. Otherwise, the jurisdiction may find the entire regulatory
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scheme thrown out by the courts as did South Carolina. For the
first time in generations, property rights advocates have an
increased number of theories and precedents on which to base
challenges to regulatory taking.
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